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different roles that community developers can take in the partner-
ship, and the factors that influence that development role.
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development even more difficult than ever, and community developers
are seeking new sources of subsidy and financing. The role of joint
venture developments in this period of scarce subsidies is discussed
through a detailed analysis of one project, Westland Avenue Apartments,
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4CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970's, non-profit community-based organizations
have often formed partnerships with private, for-profit developers in order
to complete community housing developments. The basic principle behind
these joint ventures is that the community developer and the private de-
veloper have complementary resources, and the project to some extent requires
the participation of both. As unlikely as these partnerships may seem --
since community organizations are often formed in opposition to private
developers -- they are increasingly looked to as an attractive arrangement
for fledgling community development groups without the resources to act
as a sole developer, and necessary to make a project economically viable.
The term joint venture, is applied to a wide range of projects
where there is community involvement along with a private developer. This
report focuses on projects where a community developer actively participates
in the development process with the private developer, and has an owner-
ship interest as part of a limited partnership. Although this definition
excludes many projects where community groups were very important as spon-
sers, it still encompasses a large number of diverse projects. The exact
number of joint ventures is hard to determine, although one indication is
the fact that, as of 1981, at least 19 such joint ventures had been finan-
ced by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency.1
Despite this popularity, and several highly praised examples, the
benefits to a community group in a joint venture are far from assured.
Partnership status does not ensure major control over the project, or a
5proportionate share in the proceeds resulting from equity syndication.
Community developers will frequently have only minimal control over a few
aspects of the development such as some design criteria and tenant selec-
tion, while the private developer retains control over all other decisions.
Similarly, the private developer often receives 80 to 90 percent of the
syndication proceeds. There are other joint ventures that are considered
more successful, where the community developer retained control over much
of the project and even received substantial economic benefits. The pos-
sibility for such a strong role for community developers makes joint ven-
tures very attractive, yet the more frequent case where the private developer
controls the project and its financial benefits also makes joint venturing
an uncertain and risky undertaking.
The major problem which faces community developers in a joint
venture is how to achieve the greatest amount of control and benefits from
the project given their small financial assets and other resources. Al-
though community developers have always faced financial difficulties,
more recent cutbacks in housing subsidies are making community development
efforts even more difficult and will dramatically effect the prospects for
successful community-private joint ventures in the future. In the past
decade, joint ventures relied heavily on deep housing subsidies such as
Section 236 low interest financing and Section 8 rental assistance, and
these programs for the most part provided ample profit to the private de-
veloper while producing low and moderate income housing. Community housing
development is virtually at a standstill, and community developers are
seeking new ways of producing even small amounts of subsidized housing.
Frequently this will mean participation in a development that is privately
financed and largely market-rate housing in an effort to win modest housing
6goals such as low-priced condominiums or moderate rent units. Joint ven-
tures of this type may be the only way for community developers to actively
participate in housing development.
These difficult times for community developers a-re likely to see
the re-emergence of an old dilemma, deciding the best role for community
organizations in community housing development. During the 1960's, com-
munity groups began to actively participate in housing development, first
as "sponsers" or advisors, and later as non-profit housing developers
themselves. Tenant organizations wanting to control their own housing
developments made the unusual transition into community developers with
the promise of providing affordable housing of good quality. This was
not done without considerable debate and internal conflict, however, since
many people and organizations felt that their primary responsibility was
to tenant ornagizing and that housing development would detract from that
effort and create landlord-tenant conflicts within the organization.2
Indeed, few groups have maintained both tenant organizing and housing de-
velopment activities. With relatively abundant subsidies, however, many
community organizations were able to become successful developers, some
of which are discussed later in this report. But the reduction in avail-
able subsidies, and the prospect of community developers participating in
largely private, market-rate developments requires reconsideration of the
proper role for a community development group. Does a community organi-
zation want to bear major responsibility for such a development?
This report ultimately tries to address how these housing develop-
ment changes will affect community-private joint ventures, and the best
strategies for community developers in such unusual and innovative projects.
In earlier, fully subsidized projects, community developers sought to
7maximize their control over the development while minimizing the role of
the private developer. This was a good strategy when the end result was
a 100 percent Section 8 project that the community developer could claim
responsibility for. When producing mixed-income housing with fewer com-
munity benefits, however, maximizing the community developer's role is
not only more difficult, it may be less desirable. In the abscense of
major subsidies, the community developer's role may approach community
advocate, attempting to influence the character of the development and
using the project to build the organization's strength.
This report is a comprehensive look at the roles available to
community developers in joint ventures, including the degree to which they
have retained control over the development and received financial benefits.
In some cases, community groups have acted as the managing general partner
with tremendous control, financial benefits, and responsibility for extra
costs. Other groups have had less control over the project and varying
degrees of financial benefits. These different roles are described through
several examples of joint ventures in Massachusetts over the last decade.
By analyzing these projects the report will be useful to other community
developers in determining the best joint venture role that might be expected
given its resources and the circumstances of the project.
The report also suggests a general strategy whereby community de-
velopers can achieve the most financial benefits from and control over
partnerships with private developers. In the cases where the community
developer had a major role in the project, the community developer estab-
lished early control over planning, design, and financing for the project,
and was able to bring substantial resources into these efforts via grants,
contingency work, or their own assets. Yet, community developers in this
8position still have difficulty maintaining control over construction and
management, and struggle for their share of syndication proceeds. In ad-
dition, it is not always possible for community developers to take such
an active, early role in a development, particularly newer groups with
few assets and little "track record." By examing a variety of joint ven-
tures, and suggesting strategies that will increase a community developer's
resources and negotiating strength, it is hoped that this report will aid
community developers in the future.
The second part of the report considers joint venture development
amidst the present scarcity of housing subsidies and the consequent changes
in financing. The analysis is based largely on a detailed case study of
Westland Avenue Associates, a joint venture development that includes some
of the financing techniques likely to occur in an era of scarce subsidies,
such as multiple sources of financing, so-called "internal subsidies" and
the creative use of syndication proceeds. The lessons of Westland Avenue
Associates are generalized to suggest a joint venture strategy for commu-
nity developers in similar projects in the future.
Chapters II and III provide an introduction to community developers
in the housing development process, Chapter II focusing on the constraints
that community developers face and the reasons for joint venturing with
a private developer. Chapter III is a somewhat theoretical discussion of
the goals of community developers in housing development, and the areas
where those goals conflict with private developers' motives in a joint
venture. Following this background, Chapter IV briefly describes four
different joint ventures and the role of the community developers in those
projects and other joint ventures in general. Chapter V presents the main
factors which determine what role community developers take, and formulates
9several elements of a joint venture strategy for community developers.
Chapter VI is a detailed look at the Westland Avenue joint venture,
and an analysis of the major conflicts between the private developer and
the Fenway Community Development Corporation. In some ways the Westland
Avenue project illustrates the previous analysis of joint ventures, but
it also has definite implications for future joint ventures where the
partners are struggling to overcome the lack of development subsidies.
Drawing on the Westland Avenue case, and the earlier part of the
report, Chapter VII concludes the report with a discussion of joint venture
strategies in an era of scarce development subsidies.
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CHAPTER II
CONSTRAINTS ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS
To begin understanding why community developers enter joint ven-
tures, and what the critical elements of those partnerships are, it is
important to understand certain aspects of the housing development process
that have particular bearing on community developers. Community organiza-
tions acting as housing developers have several weaknesses compared to
most private developers. Community developers are severely under capital-
ized, ie. they lack substantial financial resources including short-term
cash and long-term financial assets, or "net worth". Many community de-
velopment groups have no significant "track record" of development exper-
ience, and must rely on outside technical assistance to provide development
skills. They are also frequently rerceived as lacking long-term stability
and have a reputation for sacrificing financial feasibility for program
excesses. These weaknesses become great disadvantages to CDC's doing
housing development and as a consequence it is very difficult for commu-
nity developers to complete a housing development without a private devel-
oper partner. Thus, joint ventures are most often struck because the best
alternative -- acting as the sole developer -- is not available to the
community development group.
The following is a brief discussion of the constraints facing com-
munity developers in housing development, and which often lead to joint
ventures. As background the limited dividend sponsorship and equity syn-
dication is explained, and then the major constraints are discussed in
more detail.
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Limited Dividend Sponsorship and Equity Syndication
Sponsorship form describes the legal entity that is responsible
for a subsidized housing development and borrows funds for the project via
a mortgage. The two predominant forms of sponsorship forms chosen by de-
velopers have been non-profit and limited dividend.2 During the 1960's
and until the early 1970's, community organizations were characterized by
non-profit sponsorship, whereby the project would receive 100 percent fi-
nancing through federal mortgage guarantees or state housing agencies.3
The non-profit sponsor -- would receive a development fee to cover most
of its costs, and except for outside technical assistance would be the
sole developer and owner of the project.4 By definition, the non-profit
receives no cash benefits from ownership, and tax benefits are of no value
because the organization is tax-exempt.
Starting in the early 1970's, community developers began using the
limited dividend sponsorship form, previously only used by private devel-
opers, because it offered certain financial advantages over the non-profit
form. Non-profit sponsorship contained no financial provision to cover
rising construction costs and cost overruns, escalating operating expenses
and vacancies.5 Non-profit developers, entering into their first devel-
opment, often had no other financial assets to cover these costs, which
in some cases led to foreclosure. 6 Limited dividend sponsorship, for
reasons discussed below, often provided some financial margin for absorb-
ing unexpected costs and as a consequence has become very attractive to
both non-profit and for-profit developers. Since the early 1970's, the
vast majority of subsidized housing developments, and all of the joint
ventures discussed here, have had limited dividend sponsors.
Differences between the two sponsorship forms are quite significant.
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Limited dividend sponsers are for-profit developers whose return from
revenues is limited to six percent of equity investment.7  Financing for
limited dividend sponsors is also different. Only 90 percent financing
is available for limited dividend sponsors, as opposed to 100 percent for
non-profits. This is an exaggerated difference, however, since the lim-
ited dividend project costs include a 10 percent developers fee, referred
to as Builder/Sponsor's Profit and Risk Allowance, or BSPRA, on top of
materials, labor costs and other fees. 8 Thus, the mortgage financing typ-
ically covers 98 percent of the actual development costs depending on ac-
quisition costs, and the 10 percent developer's fee is "paper equity", not
actually invested in the project. Figured this way, the difference in
available financing between the two sponsorship forms is very small, except
that the "paper equity" becomes very important for equity syndication,
discussed below.
The most important difference between the sponsors is that limited
dividend sponsors can benefit from housing subsidies built into the federal
tax system, whereas non-profit sponsors cannot. Through a process referred
to as equity syndication, limited dividend sponsors receive an extra source
of capital which becomes profit, but is also available to cover construction
cost overruns and operating deficits. 9
Various provisions in the tax code allow the accelerated depreci-
ation of real estate for tax purposes, which effectively shelters an in-
vestor's income from taxes. These provisions are particularly valuable
for owners of low and moderate income rental housing. Section 167(k) of
the Tax Act of 1969, for example, allows the total depreciation of rehab-
ilitation expenses for low income housing over a five year period, 1 and
similar provisions exist for newly constructed low income rental housing. 11
13
The value of these provisions to limited dividend sponsors is that they
can rely on these tax benefits for their profit -- provided they have suf-
ficient income to shelter -- rather than income resulting from high rents
or the future sale of the building. As long as the project is well man-
aged and the housing subsidies keep it operationally stable, the owner
will realize profits through tax benefits. 12
If, however, the owner does not have a large income from other
sources, the tax shelter is of no value. Non-profit sponsort, by defin-
ition have no taxable income so there can be no tax benefits resulting
from the project. Limited dividend sponsors, on the other hand, can take
advantage of equity syndication, where the developer sells ownership shares
in the project to investors who receive the tax benefits. This is accom-
plished by forming a limited partnership, with investors as limited partners
(so called because their liability is limited to the amount invested) hav-
ing minimal control over the project. The developer receives the proceeds
from selling the equity shares and becomes the general partner with full
responsibility for completing and operating the project, and retains a
small remaining ownership share.
The syndication proceeds are the private developer's profit and
a cushion for absorbing unexpected expenses, or for the community developer,
an opportunity to enhance the project further by investing the proceeds
back into the building or management. Proceeds are typically about 25
percent of project costs. When the 10 percent "paper equity" is removed,
the developer has actually financed 125 percent of costs. 14  Compared to
100 percent financing for non-profit projects, limited dividend sponsorship
is clearly preferable.
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To illustrate the effect of equity sydnication on a housing pro-
ject's financing and the developer's profits, the following summarizes
the equity syndication for Brightwood Housing Associates, a joint venture
discussed in more detail later. The final project consists of 132 units,
a mixture of rehabilitated buildings and new construction, with both sub-
sidized and some market-rate units. 15 A total mortgage of $10.5 million
was obtained, which was to cover nearly all of the expected project costs.
The project was syndicated for a gross amount of $2.5 million. From this
amount, approximately $400,000 was paid in fees to lawyers and a syndica-
tion broker for packaging and selling the equity shares to investors. Of
the remaining $2.1 million net syndication proceeds, another $600,000 was
used to pay construction cost overruns, leaving $1.5 million for distri-
bution to the community developer, Brightwood Development Corporation, and
the private developer, the MB Group. The syndication proceeds are not all
paid at once, but rather the investors make a series of payments over sev-
eral years, five years in this case. Brightwood Development Corporation
will receive nearly $400,000 as its share of syndication, part of which
has been used to pay expenses encurred during the development, and $3000,000
has already been committed to another housing rehabilitation project.
(Brightwood Development Corp. has not actually received all of the payments,
but was able to borrow funds using the syndication receivables as collat-
eral.)
The Brightwood case illustrates the financial benefits of equity
syndication, which is only available to limited dividend sponsers. Total
project costs were approximately $11.2 million including overruns, while
mortgage and net syndication totalled $12.6 million. Other similar exam-
ples of community developers benefitting from syndication will be detailed
15
later.
Despite the financial benefits afforded limited dividend sponsers,
community developers still face several major constraints in their efforts
at housing development, which have been categorized below into three areas:
financial constraints; mortgage and subsidy requirements, and equity syn-
dication requirements.
Financial Constraints
Cash and credit used to pay early development expenses are the
first restraint on community developers, and often prevent them from in-
itiating projects in the first place. These up-front costs will often a-
mount to several hundred thousand dollars, including land and building
acquisition, initial feasibility studies, preliminary architectural, en-
gineering and legal fees. Up-front costs continue to rise as the project
moves toward initial closing (final mortgage commitment and first release
of construction loan funds) and while most of the costs are repayed as
part of the mortgage, the developer must cover them until the start of
construction. For instance, the Roxbury Action Program (RAP) in its de-
velopment of Marcus Garvey Gardens had accumulated during a seven year
period expenses of over $400,000 for architectural and design fees, legal
and application fees, and land acquisition, all of which was repayed at
initial closing. 16 Of those costs, $225,000 was owed to the project's
architects who had worked on a contingency basis since its inception.
Lawyers and other consultants also worked on a contingency basis and RAP
also accrued property tax debt to the City for the land, which lay unused
for several years. Without these various forms of "bridge financing",
RAP would have had to either abandon the project, or join forces with a
private developer at a much earlier point in the development process.
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Thus, one reason for joint venturing is to share these up-front costs with
a private developer.
Larger developments will have larger up-front costs, which prevents
community developers from attempting such projects. In the Brightwood de-
velopment mentioned earlier, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) required a financing fee of 1.5 percent of the mortgage at the time
of commitment (but well in advance of initial closing), or nearly $160,000
plus an additional $11,000 every three months until the project is complet-
ed. 18 The financing fee, in this case, was the responsibility of the pri-
vate developer, MB Group. Well established private developers have an im-
portant advantage in covering such large, but short-term, costs; they can
frequently use bank credit rather than their own cash to provide the funds.
This was in fact the case in the Brightwood joint venture.
Mortgage Financing and Subsidy Requirements
Even if up-front costs can somehow be financed, further require-
ments for obtaining mortgage financing and subsidy commitments may force
a community developer to joint venture. The most important of these are
net worth, credit and "working capital" requirements. The Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA), which provided subsidized financing for
several of the projects discussed here, serves as a good example. MHFA
requires developers to meet "threshold requirements" in several areas in-
cluding the "availabilty of sufficient financial resources to complete
construction of the proposed development" and for limited dividend spon-
sors, a net worth requirement with "significant liquidity" of 15 to 20
percent of the mortgage amount.19 Mortgage security requirements, such
as a four percent letter of credit and syndication guarantees are an
17
additional strain on non-profit resources.20 Furthermore, the' developer
must have the appropriate housing experience and capacity to complete the
project. "A. new developer without sufficient experience, expertise of staff
capacity is encouraged to strengthen his or her record by entering into
a joint effort with a developer who has an established record of success.. ."21
Most community developers do not meet these threshold requirements.
Few will have the financial assets and they are viewed as lacking experience
and expertise; "it is a lot easier to do business with people who are ex-
22
perienced" remarked one MHFA loan officer, referring to his preference
for private developers. According to a senior mortgage officer at MHFA,
these threshold and security requirements were developed with the know-
ledge that they would force community developers to joint venture, and this
was an intended effect of the policies. 23
Similarly, HUD frequently imposes net worth and working capitol
requirements on sponsors for mortgage and subsidy approval , and will judge
a developer's capacity to complete a project based largely on financial
resources, stability, and development history.24
Requirements For Equity Syndication
Finally, community developers are restricted in their ability to
syndicate their projects, stemming from both Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
requirements and from the need to provide security to investors.
IRS requirements for limited partnerships, called Safe Harbor
Rules,25 must be met to prevent the partnership from being treated as a
taxable corporation. The most difficult of these to meet for community
developers is the net worth requirement, which requires the general part-
ner's total new worth to equal 15 percent of syndication proceeds.26 Thus,
in the case of Brightwood Housing Associates, where capital contributions
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by investors were $2.5 million, the general partners needed a net worth
of $375,000. Community developers unable to show this net worth -- as was
the case with Brightwood Development Corporation -- will have to joint
venture with a private developer to provide the financial assets.
Community developers will also frequently need the private devel-
oper's reputation to secure equity syndication. Equity investors are
usually located through brokers, or equity syndicators, rather than di-
rectly offering the partnership shares to potential buyers. Equity syn-
dicaters, and their investors, generally view non-profit community devel-
opers as lacking stability because of thier volunteer board of directors
and lack of profit incentives. 27  By adding a more experienced developer
with a reputation and financial assets, the project is more easily sold
to equity investors and for a larger sum of money.28
In summary, community developers have difficulty as limited dividend
sponsors largely because of their lack of financial resources and develop-
ment experience. Joint venturing is frequently seen as a way to overcome
these constraints since the private developer in the partnership can pro-
vide those resources which the community developer lacks: short-term cash
and credit; developer expertise and reputation; and significant financial
assets for net worth. Unfortunately, the options for community developers
undertaking a housing development are slim. Non-profit sponsorship is
virtually infeasible because of the lack of syndication proceeds, so that
the only alternative to joint venturing is acting as the sole general part-
ner, which due to the constraints discussed above is only available to
the most experienced and well financed community development groups. For
fledgling community developers without financial assets or experience,
joint venturing is a necessity if the community developer is to participate
19
in the project in any capacity other than a passive advisor.
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CHAPTER III
COMMUNITY AND PRIVATE DEVELOPERS:
CONFLICTING GOALS AND INTERESTS
Community-private partnerships are, in some ways, no different
from most business joint ventures. The basic principle is that the part-
ners have complementary resources and the participation of both is needed
to complete the development. But a joint venture between a non-profit,
community-based organization and a for-profit private developer is by no
means a typical business relationship. The two partners have very differ-
ent motivations in the development, and their goals are often in conflict.
Where the private developer is primarily involved for the profit opportu-
nities, the community developer usually has a more complicated set of
social, political and financial goals for the project.
This chapter examines the goals of community developers in housing
development, and their specific objectives in joint ventured projects. By
also considering the objectives of private developers, it becomes clear
where the two partners' interests are in conflict in a joint venture. This
is an appropriate introduction to the following chapters because the dif-
fering goals and the resulting conflicts are behind most of the negotiating
issues between the joint venture partners. ' The resolution or compromise
of these issues is reflected in the role that the community developer takes
in the partnership and ultimately in the housing development itself.
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The Goals of Community Developers
Community development groups, either CDC's, tenant organizations,
or civic groups, usually undertake housing development to further a vari-
ety of goals. These include not only housing goals, but also social,
political and economic goals as well. As such, housing development pro-
rams are often a critical component in a broader community development
strategy by community organizations. The following is a brief description
of the major goals which, depending on the organization, most community
housing developers are trying to achieve to some extent.
Housing goals: The most immediate goal is providing decent and
affordable housing to community residents through the subsidized devel-
opment of new construction or rehabilitated housing. This also includes
physical improvement of the neighborgood such as renovating abandoned
buildings and creating attractive public spaces.
Economic Development Goals: Housing developments are frequently
used by community groups to achieve broader economic development goals by
creating temporary and permanent jobs for community residents, creating
work for local subcontractors and suppliers, and generally stimulating
the local economy.
Organizational Goals: Successfully completing a housing develop-
ment increases the credibility and political strength of a community
organization. This is in addition to any income from the project which
pays staff, helps cover overhead, and increases the organizations assets.
Community Participation Goals: Community housing developers are
often attempting to affect the housing development process by promoting
community input into design decisions, hiring issues during construction,
2
and management operations. Successfully creating a more open development
22
process may be a goal in itself.
How, then, do community developers expect to achieve these goals
through a joint venture with a private developer? Basically, community
developers enter joint ventures seeking two main objectives: Maintaining
some control over the project's development and management, and receiving
a share of the economic benefits that result from equity syndication.
The control objectives relate very directly to all of the com-
munity development goals mentioned above. Design control is important to
ensure that the project meets the community group's own criteria such as
height restrictions or providing large family units, both as an important
area for community participation and to further the community developer's
own physical development goals for the neighborhood. Control is also im-
portant to ensure that the housing development will remain as subsidized
housing or some preferred income mix that is originally planned. Manage-
ment control is important not only to ensure proper management, but also
because the community developer will often have its own priorities regard-
ing tenant selection and management. In one case discussed later, the
community developer wanted management control explicitly to ensure that
neighborhood residents would be given priority for renting units. Simi-
larly, community developers may want guarantees for local hiring quotas
or minority hiring quotas from the general contractor.
Maintaining project control also is important for the organiza-
tion's own interest, since ownership and control add to the group's repu-
tation and development "track record". The more control that the community
developer has over the project, including planning and design, construction
and management, the more likely it is to further the organization's
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reputation and political strength in the community. Riverside/Cambridgeport
Community Corporation, for example, achieved its first visible development
through a joint venture. Similarly, the Fenway Community Development
Corporation was virtually dormant prior to its involvement in Westland
Avenue Associates. After completion of a highly visible project in the
Fenway, the CDC is one of the stronger community groups in the neighbor-
hood and has an increasing membership.3
Conversely, the Roxbury Action Program was severely criticised by
some community leaders and the media because of its small ownership share
in Marcus Garvey Gardens -- less than 1 percent -- and ultimately its lack
of control. 4 As an organization devoted to increasing the resources of
Boston's Black community, retaining ownership and control over the project
was very important, and after ownership was transferred primarily to a
white construction firm and 'doctors in Florida', RAP was viewed as having
sold out.5 While the value of ownership in this case is largely symbolic,
and RAP's reply was that they voluntarily gave up ownership for the eco-
nomic benefits, there is no doubt that RAP lost credibility because of the
small amount of control that they were able to retain.
The financial benefits from joint ventures are also used to further
community goals, and this is a major difference between syndicated devel-
opments that include community groups and those that do not. Whereas
private developers use syndication proceeds as a profit margin to reward
risks, community developers use the extra money to enhance the original
project or stimulate other housing development.6 Community developers
will frequently use proceeds to provide additional amenities to the project
such as a day care program, recreation hall or better landscaping, to re-
duce the project's rents or improve operations. In one case discussed in
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Chapter 4, syndication proceeds went to support an operating deficit.
Alternatively, a community developer can use the proceeds from a
joint venture to increase the organization's net worth and financial sta-
bility, which enables it to initiate and develop other projects. This
was the case with the Brightwood Development Corporation, mentioned
earlier, which used $300,000 in proceeds to start a 51 unit multi-family
housing regabilitation project.
Besides financial benefits, housing development also entails fi-
nancial liability which community developers may share with their private
partners. As with private developers, community developers will seek the
greatest share of syndication proceeds possible, while minimizing its
liability for construction cost overruns or operation deficits. With po-
tential benefits as large as mentioned above, community developers are
clearly not unconcerned with the financial feasibility of their housing
developments, as they are sometimes characterized.
Private Developers: The Other Partner
As mentioned above, private developers are primarily interested
in subsidized housing development because of the potential for large pro-
fits. There are two major sources of profits in limited dividend projects:
syndication proceeds for the developer, and profits from construction
overhead and fees for the general contractor.8  Thus, developers will
want a large share of syndication to ensure their profit, particularly if
the developer is not also the contractor. In many joint ventures, the
developer and contractor are the same, which gives the developer an extra
source of profit, and theoretically more flexibility in negotiating a
share of syndication proceeds.
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Private developers are equally concerned about control as commu-
nity developers. From the private developer's perspective, control is
necessary to design a project that is profitable, and minimize any losses
that might result from cost overruns or operating deficits. The private
developer is concerned that the non-profit community developer will have
unrealistic objectives for the project, such as design amenities, minority
hiring and providing social services at the expense of financial feasibil-
ity.9 Not confident that the community developer has the ability to
properly control the development, the private developer will prefer complete
control over design and construction, with the community developer possibly
taking a role in operation management. 1 In lieu of this situation, a
private developer will try to keep the community developer out of day-to-day
operations, and instead limit them to reviewing final drawings, approving
major change orders, and agreeing on a management agent.11  In this way,
the developer hopes to avoid major delays due to constant interference by
the community partner, with its slow decision making processes and non-
financial priorities.
Maintaining some control over management is also important because
of the continued potential for reduced profits. If the project is poorly
managed and operates at a deficit, the developer will be responsible for
some of that loss. In addition, final syndication payments are often con-
tingent upon stable operations two or three years after construction comple-
tion. Poor operations may thus result in reduced or delayed syndication
proceeds.
Along with maintaining control, private developers also want the
community developer to take some liability for construction and operating
costs. In some cases, private developers will want the community partner
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to take liability for very specific construction costs for which the
community developer is responsible. (This is clear in the Westland Avenue
Associates case, discussed in Chapter VI). Similarly, if the community
developer is responsible for management, the private developer may insist
that it also take liability for operating deficits.
There is also the issue of community responsibility and reptutation.
Is it possible that some developers will be interested in joint venturing
with a community group out of a sense of "responsible development?" Al-
ternatively, do private developers feel that such a partnership will enhance
their reputation as a "responsible developer", either to the community
they build on, or to the government agencies they rely on for financing?
Community groups often seek developers that they regard as more
community-minded than others, and a small group of developers, such as
the Housing Economics/George Macomber team, and Ed Abrams, have formed
several joint ventures with community groups. This is clearly due in part
to their willingness to work with community groups, but it is not neces-
sarily the result of a special interest in promoting such partnerships.
Subsidized housing developments can be highly profitable to the contractor
and developer, and because of the guaranteed rental income, are less risky
than many market-rate developments. This is the main reason why these
developers continue to produce subsidized housing developments, and sug-
gests the main conflicts that exist. In the following chapter which de-
scribes four joint ventures in more detail, it will be important to observe
how these conflicts arise in specific issues, and how they are resolved
(or remain unresolved) through the role of the community developer in the
partnership.
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SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY AND PRIVATE DEVELOPER CONFLICTS
Community Developer
* Wants to maximize control to promote
community participation in develop-
ment process, and enhance the organ-
ization's development repuation.
* Wants to promote design criteria
based on community priorities, with
the objective of maximizing housing
gains from the project.
* Wantsmanagement control to ensure
and promote further community
priorities regarding tenant selection,
management, and resale.
* May want to include economic/employ-
ment objectives in construction, such
as resident or minority hiring quotas.
* Wants to maximize the community
developer's share of syndication
proceeds.
* Wants private developer to cover
up-front development costs, partic-
ularly larger amounts such as
financing fees.
*Wants private developer to take
liability for construction overruns
and operating deficits, essentially
guaranteeing its own syndication
proceeds.
Private Developer
* Wants to minimize community partic-
ipation to ensure profitability, and
because of the potential for project
delays as a result of community
i nterferance.
e Wants to limit community control of
design, fearing unreasonable design
objectives at the expense of financial
criteria.
* Wants to limit community control over
management, fearinq unreasonable
objectives and lack of organizational
stability, particularly in first few
years of operation.
e Usually opposed to hiring quotas
because of the potential for increasing
costs, causing delays, and union
difficulties. (However, private
developers differ widely on this issue)
* Wants to minimize the community
developer's share of syndication
proceeds.
e Wants to put as little cash at risk as
possible, preferring the community
developer to cover up-front costs.
* Wants to share liability with community
developer, particularly for specific
costs resulting from community design
priorities.
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CHAPTER IV
COMMUNITY DEVELOPER ROLES IN JOINT VENTURES
This chapter describes, largely through example, the various roles
that community developers have taken in joint ventures with private devel-
opers. The first part of the chapter briefly describes four community-
private joint ventures that collectively illustrate a wide range of roles
and circumstances surrounding the projects.
Rehab I, a project by Inquilinos Boricas en Accion, is an example
of a community developer in a managing general partner position, with the
private developer having a- minor role. 808 Memorial Drive is a joint ven-
ture where Riverside/Cambridgeport Community Corporation used its political
strength to change the design and rent structure of a project started by
a private developer. In Marcus Garvey Gardens, the Roxbury Action Program
was facing financial collapse and ended up with little control over a
project it had worked on for eight years. Brightwood Housing Associates
is an example of a strong role for the community developer, Brightwood
Development Corporation, but where the private developer is still the
managing partner.
The second part of this chapter integrates these case illustrations
into a more thorough analysis of joint venture roles, based on the community
developer's partnership position, syndication benefits, and control over
various phases of the project. This analysis is summarized into three
general joint venture roles for community developers.
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PART ONE: FOUR CASE ILLUSTRATIONS OF JOINT VENTURE ROLES
Inquilinos Boricas en Accion(IBA, Boston, Mass.1
Inquilinos Boricas en Accion, or IBA, is one of the most success-
ful community housing developers in the Boston area. Since 1971, it has
completed five major housing projects, totalling nearly 600 units, a mix-
ture of new construction and rehabilitation for both families and elderly
residents. In all of its developments, IBA worked closely with Greater
Boston Community Development, Inc., a non-profit organization that provides
technicial assistance to community housing sponsors. IBA's first project,
Rehab I (later named Casas Borinquen I) was one of the first syndicated
housing projects to include a community organization as the managing part-
ner. It subsequently became a model for future EBA projects, and to some
extent for other community developers.
IBA began as a predominantly Puerto Rican tenant organization --
then known as the Emergincy Tenants Council, or ETC -- focusing on a group
of deteriorated row houses and empty lots known as Parcel 19, an urban
renewal parcel slated for demolition by the Boston Redevelopment Authority.
By combining its own political and technical strength with other community
and church organizations opposed to the existing urban renewal plans, IBA
(then ETC) eventually won designated developer status for Parcel 19, which
essentially is an option to purchase the land from the BRA. With the help
of small grants and church support, and technical assistance from GBCD,
the tenant group formulated its own development plan for rehabilitating
the existing row houses. ETC's major goal for the project was to retain
control over tenant selection and management to assure that existing resi-
dents would be the major occupants.
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A strong development team was formed, including John Sherret, a
local architect who had worked with community groups; Stanley Sidney, a
builder who became the general contractor; and a prestigio'us Boston law
firm. Plans were completed for 71 rehabbed units containing a mixture of
bedroom sizes and four commercial spaces for neighborhood stores. GBCD
and ETC submitted applications for Section 236 financing, mortgage in-
surance, and state and federal rent supplements. HUD gave the project a
firm commitment in early 1971. A 121(A) agreement was reached with the
City of Boston, whereby the project would pay approximately half the
property taxes it would otherwise pay. With a land cost writedown from
the Boston Redevelopment Authority, ETC purchased the properties and land
also in early 1971.
At this point, the community developer made a decision that was
very innovative at the time. The original plan had been to build housing
as a non-profit sponsor, but GBCD recommended that ETC become a limited
dividend sponsor instead. The resulting proceeds, GBCD argued, could be
used to cover cost overruns and operating deficits and as seed money for
other projects. The community group was hesitant to sell the majority of
ownership in the project to wealthy investors after they had struggled
for years to control the land. The limited dividend development would
only be acceptable if ETC retained control of architecture and design,
tenant selection and management, resale of the project, and received a
large share of the syndication proceeds as well. To achieve this, ETC
would have to become the managing general partner, that is, the partner
controlling the development and operation of the project.
Despite the strong development team that ETC had assembled, it
was not possible for the community organization to be the sole general
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general partner. ETC had no "track record" of previous development, and
investors considered it too risky for an inexperienced, non-profit organ-
ization to guarantee the construction and management. There were also HUD
requirements for working capital, and IRS regulations requiring the general
partner to have a net worth of at least 15 percent of the syndication pro-
ceeds. In this case, the general partner needed around $50,000 in new
worth, which ETC was unable to meet. An experienced developer was needed,
who would act as a general partner lending his or her reputation and net
worth, but leaving ETC as the managing general partner with most of the
control over the project. ETC offerred the general contractor, Stanley
Sidney, $30,000 and a 27 percent limited partnership share in the project
in exchange for remaining as a general partner in the project and absorbing
some of the liability and risks. In summary, ETC provided the developer
designation and the land, the seed money for planning and development, and
the net worth necessary to complete a limited partnership development.
Although Sidney originally wanted equal management control, ETC
insisted on being the managing general partner, with Sidney taking a very
minimal role in management. A management escrow account was set up, and
after $40,000 in deficits, decisions would be made equally by ETC and
Sidney. This was seen as security for investors concerned about ETC's
management ability. ETC also had most of the liability for development
cost overruns, although Sidney had some as well. Both of the general
partners had to approve any sale or refinancing of the project.
Total syndication proceeds for Rehab I were valued at $350,000,
although Sidney received a $100,000 share as his payment. ETC received
approximately $200,000 in net proceeds, although some of its earlier ex-
penses had to be paid from that amount. More important than these financial
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benefits, ETC formed its own management firm, ETC Management, which was
hired to oversee tenant selection, maintenance operations and rent collec-
tion. The syndication proceeds were partly used to provide amenities to
the projects such as improved landscaping and social services.
Rehab I was only the beginning of IBA's history as a community
developer. The "net worth partner" model was u-sed in subsequent develop-
ments. In the recently completed Viviendas La Victoria II, IBA was the
sole general partner providing the net worth and development reputation.
808 Memorial Drive; Cambridge, Mass. 2
In early 1972, the Riverside/Cambridgeport Community Corporation
(RCCC) was opposing a new housing development in its neighborhood. Zena
Nemetz, an architect and recently a developer, had proposed a high rise
apartment complex on the Charles River waterfront, which at the time was
the site of several gas stations and repair garages. The project involved
a complicated land assembly process using sale-leasebacks and the air
rights above the garages, and required a zoning variance from the Cambridge
Zoning Board of Appeals.
RCCC was actually a coalition of citizen groups in the two Cambridg.e
neighborhoods, both stable, working-class areas with Riverside having a
large Black population. Although the organization had only recently been
formed, it was a strong political force in the neighborhoods and the City.
The first president of RCCC, Saundra Graham, later became a City Councilor
and State Representative. The proposed housing development on the river-
front touched on two issues that the community group was heavily involved
in; increasing the supply of affordable housing and retaining public access
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and views of the Charles River. Harvard University, which abutts the
Riverside neighborhood, had recently expanded onto a large parcel of the
riverfront to use the land for student dormitories, taking many homes in
the process and greatly reducing the neighborhood's access to the river.
With the memory of HArvard's latest encroachment still fresh in their
minds, the neighborhood group was not going to allow a "luxury enclave"
to become another barrier between themselves and the river. With the
support of the Cambridge Planning Board, RCCC successfully stopped the
zoning variance with the intent to permanently halt the development.
Recognizing that the project could not continue without the approval of
the neighborhood group and the Planning Board, Nemetz soon proposed to
RCCC that they work together to arrive at at acceptable plan which could
then be jointly submitted to the Zoning Board of Appeals. Seeing an op-
purtunity for subsidized housing development, RCCC moved from a position
of total opposition to the project to the formation of objectives for the
development if it should proceed. RCCC wanted some subsidized housing
that would be affordable to existing neighborhood residents and significant
design changes to improve access to the river and lesson the visual impact
of high rise buildings. A portion of the syndication profits would allow
RCCC to work on other housing projects.
The community group was admittedly inexperienced in housing devel-
opment and real estate negotiations. Although RCCC knew its bargaining
position was strong, it had no idea how far the developer could be pushed
before being forced to abondon the project. Peter Bruckner, a Cambridge
architect and vice president of RCCC, and other RCCC members negotiated
with Nemetz and with the developer's architects, changing the unit mix
to include many three and four bedroom units. The parking garage was put
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underground -- an important change for access and visual reasons -- and
the orientation and massing of the building was changed, although the
height stayed the same. Most participants agreed that the design was sig-
nificantly improved. The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency agreed to
finance the project and provide subsidies. Seventy-six units would be
3low income and 136 moderate income out of the total 301 units.
This new development proposal, with the support of RCCC, was ap-
proved by the Planning Board and received a variance from the Board of
Zoning Appeals by the end of 1972. At the start of construction, RCCC
received $100,000, or ten percent of the net proceeds from equity syndi-
cation, as its share in the development and became a "sponsor limited
partner", with some control over the choice of the management agent, but
little liability for cost overruns.
Zena Nemetz had put tremendous effort into the land assembly, but
in the end needed very little equity, since roughly 98 percent of the pro-
ject was financed by MHFA. She received most of the syndication proceeds
(which were higher because of the tax provisions for low income rentals)
although she also absorbed some modest construction cost overruns. As
important was the subsidized financing and secure rent contract from Sec-
tion 236 rent supplements for many of the units. The market-rate luxury
apartments, as originally planned, would have been a far more risky de-
velopment.
Bruckner was initially fairly pleased with the results. RCCC had
achieved a riverfront development that included low and moderate income
housing. The design was improved, although the biggest problem of river-
front access was not solved. After construction began, it became impossible
to build the garage underground due to soil conditions and it was built
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above ground instead. Perhaps most improtant, RCCC received its first
large influx of money, using its share of proceeds to develop another
thirty unit subsidized housing project. RCCC was later criticised for
the results of its joint venture. Why, other community activists ask,
did the community developer not receive 50 percent of the syndication
proceeds, since it clearly had the power to stop the development? Why
did the project remain a high-rise when RCCC was originally opposed to
that design?
Marcus Garvey Gardens; Roxbury, Mass.4
After completing two small housing rehabilitation projects in the
Highland Park neighborhood, in 1972 the Roxbury Action Program (RAP) began
planning its largest project to date -- the new construction of 140 units
of elderly and family housing in John Elliot Square. Eventually named
Marcus Garvey Gardens, after the famous Black leader and patriot, it was
the key to RAP's goal of creating a "model Black community ... where all
races and incomes could live but where the tone, character and leadership
would be established by the Black majority."5 It was thus crucial that
the Black organization retain control and ownership of the project. The
initial plan was to syndicate ownership shares to limited partners with
RAP becoming the sole general partner with management control and partial
ownership. They had soon purchased the land for the development, and
hired the Black-owned architecture firm of Stull Associates. A major goal
of the project was to stimulate local Black economic development and enter-
prises, and a minority-owned construction firm became the general contractor.
By 1976, RAP was still struggling to obtain financing commitments,
and the project was transferred to financing under the Massachusetts
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Housing Finance Agency. During this period, RAP also accrued tremendous
debts both from the Marcus Garvey Gardens and other operations totalling
over $500,000. RAP's only hope for repaying these debts was through the
Marcus Garvey project, which placed increasing emphasis on the financial
benefits of the project.
In 1977, RAP received a mortgage commitment from MHFA for a 125-unit
development version of Marcus Garvey Gardens, conditional on RAP finding
a financially strong and secure partner to act as a co-developer. This
action by MHFA was prompted partly by RAP's growing instability but also
by new requirements adopted by the agency for approval of sponsor/developers.
RAP could not meet the new conditions and consequently sought a joint ven-
ture partner who would provide the needed financial assets but allow RAP
to remain a co-general partner with equal control over the project. It
would not be easy to find a partner willing to provide all the forthcoming
financing, assume most of the risk, and share control with the community
group.
The project was also in need of a new general contractor, and un-
able to find another minority contractor, RAP chose the Macomber Construction
Company. In lieu of a minority contractor, RAP wanted assurances of 50
percent minority hiring and 30 percent minority subcontractors for the
project, and eventually compromised at a 40 percint hiring quota.
RAP began negotiation with several potential general partners,
including two minority firms. In all cases, the private developers in-
sisted that RAP take a limited partner position, and also take responsibility
for most construction overruns and operating deficits. Six months of nego-
tiations were unsuccessful, as RAP watched its goal of Black community
control over Marcus Garvey Gardens rapidly slip away.
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By early 1979, RAP now had debts of over $650,000 and urgently
needed the mortgage closing and syndication proceeds to keep the organiza-
tion from bankruptcy. RAP approached George Macomber, of Macomber Devel-
opment, to be the general partner, as a last desperate attempt to save
the project. As the builder and developer, RAP hoped that Macomber would
be willing to use a share of syndication to cover construction costs above
the MHFA mortgage. Macomber would also be motivated to control construc-
tion costs and reduce the length of construction period. Macomber, along
with Robert Keuhn of Housing Economics, agreed to become the general part-
ners for the development under the condition that RAP become a limited
partner similar to the position offerred in previous negotiations. The
City of Boston was also preventing RAP from taking a general partner posi-
tion. Because RAP had an outstanding property tax bill, the Boston Rede-
velopment Authority would not allow the necessary 121(A) agreement if RAP
took a general partner position. Desiring to see the development proceed
and pay its debt from proceeds, RAP accepted Macomber's limited partner
offer. RAP's goal of Black control, symbolically at least, was lost.
RAP received, as a "development fee", a total of $600,000 from
syndication proceeds, which was in addition to its direct costs for the
project -- such as architectural fees and land costs -- which were largely
covered out of the mortgage. RAP was only liable for $30,000 in construc-
tion cost overruns. In contrast, Macomber absorbed $220,000 in actual
construction costs above the mortgage amount. Originally, RAP and Macomber
were both designated a management agent for the project, but RAP later
dropped its own agent having determined that Macomber's was acceptable.
The final 161 unit, largely elderly project was completed in late
1980, more than eight years after initially conceived. Lloyd King, the
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executive director of RAP since 1978 feels reasonably pleased with the
project despite the loss of control. Because of RAP's instability, he
concedes, it was probably best that its responsibility for completing the
project was reduced. On the positive side, the minority hiring record
for construction was 67 percent, and RAP has continued as "advisors" in
tenant selection land management.
RAP was severely criticised in the media and much of the Black
community for its lack of formal control and ownership in the final part-
nership. An editorial in The Boston Globe called the development part
of a "white takeover" of the Highland Park area, and an example of white
developers profitting from the Black community. 6
Brightwood Housing Associates; Springfield, Mass.7
The Brightwood Development Corporation (BDC), a non-profit com-
munity development corporation in Springfield's North End had developed
a considerable record of developments by 1979. Its for-profit predecessor,
Brightwood Corporation, had completed several projects including a shopping
center and super market, started a credit union, and rehabilitated several
abandoned buildings with federal 312 loans and Community Development Block
Grand funds. Yet Austin Miller, the executive director of BDC, felt that
its latest project was too large and complicated for the small community
developer to complete as a sole developer.
BDC, with the help of several present and former public officials
and housing specialists in the Springfield area, had completed with unusual
success the initial planning for a major housing rehabilitation and new
construction project. The Brightwood project included 110 units of Sec-
tion 8 housing in several buildings, and 76 market-rate units in 8
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rehabilitated buildings. BDC had received a $25,000 grant to obtain
purchase options on sixty lots by December, 1979. Marvin Siflinger, di-
rector of the Boston HUD Area Office had given preliminary approval to
Section 8 subsidies, and BDC had applied for Section 221(D)(4) mortgage
insurance and a $2.1 million Urban Development Action Grant, or UDAG. By
assembling a very strong, comprehensive housing and commercial development
proposal for the blighted neighborhood, BDC convinced the city administra-
tion to give full support to its various applications.
Despite these accomplishments, Miller and other housing experts
involved in the planning felt that a private joint venture partner was
needed, primarily because of the financial resources required to close
the financing (cash and credit needs were estimated at close to $1 million,
including $300,000 in up-front costs and GNMA "tandem" fees) but also be-
cause BDC had no experience in Section 8 projects, and a private developer
with such experience would help the development. After a brief search,
BDC began working with the MG Group, a Boston-based developer and property
manager with substantial Section 8 experience, and formed Brightwood Hous-
ing Associates. BDC's main goal in the partnership was to establish a
"50/50 decision making process,"8 where the partners would be equal co-
developers in the project. Syndication proceeds were less important to
BDC, and Miller was willing to forego a major share of proceeds for his
goal of equal control. The partners agreed to a 75 - 25 percent split of
net proceeds favoring the MB group, and operated from an understanding of
50/50 decision making. These agreements were not detailed in writing.
As part of the initial agreement, BDC was to cover all up-front
costs except the GNMA fee and other closing costs which were MB's respon-
sibility. To cover its costs, BDC received a $135,000 loan from the
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Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation. The partners
worked together finalizing architectural plans and securing the financing
and subsidies.
The first major conflict between the partners occurred when it
came time to pay the GNMA commitment fee. MB Group decided not to pay
the fee (which reserves the financing for the project) feeling that it
would be available at a later date, for a larger mortgage, and MB would
save monthly interest charges before initial closing. MB was hesitant
to put its own financial resources at risk. Miller of BDC was concerned
that the financing might not be available again and the project would be
lost, but more importantly, he was disturbed that MB had made the decision
on its own without including BDC in the decision and consultations with
HUD. The 50/50 decision making, from BDC's perspective, had been broken.
As the project approached initial closing, Austin Miller realized
that he and MB did not have the same understanding of their initial agree-
ment regarding co-development. It was imperative to. BDC to retain equal
control through construction and management. MB, however, had understood
the 50/50 process to end at initial closing, when MB would become the
managing general partner with a lesser role for BDC. With 75 percent
of the proceeds, MB also had a 75 percent of the liability, and with such
large risks would not give equal control to a community group that might
interfere with sound business judgement and financial decisions. Without
a written agreement, there was no way of verifying either partner's position.
After tense negotiations, a compromise was eventually reached,
where MB would be the managing general partner from construction until
February, 1985, when BDC would become the managing partner and MB would
revert to a limited partner position. During the earlier period, BDC
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would have an equal voice on several decisions of importance to the com-
munity developer, including changes in the construction contract, changes
in the management agent, and sale or refinancing. The total long-term
control was extremely important to BDC.
Financing was secured, with a mortgage for $10.5 million, $1.5
greater than the earlier application. Total syndication was $2.5 million,
and net after fees and construction overruns was $1.5 million, of which
BDC received nearly $400,000. Both the Section 8 and market-rate develop-
ments were completed and largely rented by November, 1982.
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PART TWO: A GENERAL SUMMARY OF JOINT VENTURE ROLES FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPERS
Partnership Position of the Community Developer
The legal position of the community developer in the limited part-
nership is a general indicator of its overall role in the joint venture.
Besides specifying the community developer's legal control over various
aspects of the project, the partnership position may also determine its
liability for construction overruns and operating deficits, and its share
of syndication proceeds. Along with these legal statements of the commu-
nity developer's role, there is also considerable symbolic importance to
being a general versus limited partner in the development.
Limited partnerships normally have two partnership classes: gen-
eral partners, with management responsibility and corresponding liability,
and investor limited partners who purchase equity shares and receive the
benefits as owners described in Chapter 2, but have no management author-
ity and only limited liability. In community-private joint ventures, a
third class of partner is frequently created which suits the needs of the
community developer, referred to as a "special" of "sponsor" limited partner.
This third partnership form is useful when the community developer either
does not want to be a general partner because of the liability for cost
overruns, or cannot be a general partner because of resistance by the
private developer or others. A special limited partner will allow the
community developer certain rights over management (which investor limit-
eds cannot have) and receive a share of syndication proceeds without
becoming a general partner, yet have limited liability similar to an in-
vestor limited partner.
The four joint ventures described above illustrate the main
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partnership positions that community developers have taken in joint ven-
tures; managing general partner; minor general partner; and special
limited partner.
The managing general partner position allows the community de-
veloper almost complete control over the development and on going operation
of the project. The private developer will still be a general partner,
usually for net worth purposes, but with a relatively minor role in manage-
ment. This is the strongest partnership position available to a community
developer in a joint venture.
This position is best illustrated by "ETC Rehab I", where the
Emergency Tenants Council was the managing general partner, and Stan Sidney
took a nominal general partner position. Provided operation deficits did
not exceed $40,000, ETC retained virtually complete control over the pro-
ject's management, tenant selection and future resale. ETC also carried
a large amount of liability for cost overruns (up to the first $100,000)
and operating deficits (half of the first $40,000).
In the minor general partner position, the community developer is
still a general partner, but with limited control over certain decisions.
The private developer is the managing general partner in this case, with
the majority of control and responsibility for the project. Along with
the community developer's lessened sphere of control is reduced liability
for cost overruns.
Brightwood Housing Associates illustrates a community developer
with a minor general partner position. Brightwood Development Corporation,
(BDC) and the MB Group (MB) reached a partnership agreement whereby BDC
must approve final drawings or specifications and any changes in the con-
struction contract, any sale or refinancing of the project, and the renewal
44
9
of the management agent's contract. MB retained control over most of
the partnership's business, including hiring decisions and payment of ex-
penses.10 BDC and MB divided liability for overruns and deficits in the
same proportion as syndication proceeds: 25 percent to BDC, and 75 per-
cent to MB. The most interesting aspect of BDC's partnership agreement
is that a side agreement specifies that the positions of the general
partner, with the private developer having a minor role.
The special limited partner position as mentioned above, provides
the community developer with control or veto power over only very few and
specific decisions such as tenant selection or management agents, and is
usually accompanied by minimal liability. In general, private developers
prefer community developers as limited partners because it leaves the pri-
vate developer, as the sole general partner, with complete control over
most decisions.
Both Riverside/Cambridgeport Community Corporation (RCCC) and the
Roxbury Action Program (RAP) took special limited partner positions in
their respective joint ventures. In the original agreement with Macomber/
Keuhn, RAP retained control over the project's management agent. It also
had partial liability for extra costs due to construction delays, and
11
any change orders required by MHFA. In the end, however, RAP gave up
its control over the management agent in exchange for further reduced
liability to a maximum of $30,000. The community group participated in
tenant selection but remained in the partnership as an advisor only.
Westland Avenue Associates, a detailed case study in the second
part of this report, is also an example of a special limited partner
position where the community developer has limited control over specific
decisions.
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Syndication Benefits
The distribution of syndication proceeds, sometimes referred to
as "partnership share", is also a general indication of the community
developer's role in the joint venture. Community developers with a large
partnership share (50 percent, for example) are more likely to also have
a managing general partner position and the control that is associated
with it. Conversely, a community developer with special limited partner-
ship might be expected to have a smaller share of syndication proceeds.
Marcus Garvey Gardens, however, is a clear exception to this rule since
RAP received more than 50 percent of the proceeds but became a special
limited partner with virtually no legal control.
When considering the distribution of proceeds to each partner, it
is not really adequate to consider just the partnership share, ie. the
percentage to each partner. Instead, several other aspects should be
taken into account, including: development costs not included in mortgage
financing, but deducted from syndication proceeds before distribution,
(ie. reducing net syndication but not affecting relative distribution);
development costs encurred by each partner which must be covered out of
respective proceed shares, effectively reducing that partner's share; li-
ability for construction cost overruns and operating deficits which may
be deducted from syndication proceeds; and restrictions on the uses of
net syndication proceeds by each partner, such as the creation of manage-
ment reserve fund, or paying for improved landscaping, day care facili-
ties, etc...
It is also important to realize that, whereas syndication proceeds
are the community developer's only source of financial benefit, private
developers will also profit from construction or management contracts,
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if they also take that role in the development.
A wide range of syndication benefits is illustrated by the joint
ventures described earlier:
* Inquilinos Borricas en Accion, in "ETC Rehab I" received nearly
$200,000 of the total $350,000 gross equity syndication. Of this amount,
$20,000 went toward a management reserve to cover operating deficits, and
IBA had liability for construction overruns up to half its net syndication
share, or nearly $100,000.
* The Roxbury Action Program received $600,000 as a "developer's
fee" for Marcus Garvey Gardens, over half of the net syndication proceeds
with no restrictions other than $30,000 liability for cost overruns. All
other development expenses which RAP had encurred were payed from the
MHFA mortgage.
* Brightwood Development Corporation received 25 percent of net
syndication proceeds remaining after construction cost overruns. Thus,
of the $2.1 million net proceeds (after syndicator's fees), $600,000 went
toward cost overruns, and BDC received approximately $400,000 of the re-
maining syndication.12 Of these proceeds, $70,000 was used to pay BDC's
development costs not already covered by the mortgage. 13
a Riverside/Cambridgeport Community Corporation received $100,000
in syndication proceeds, or 10 percent of total proceeds. Although there
were construction overruns and operating deficits on the project, RCCC
was not liable and utilized the full amount in subsequent housing devel-
opments.
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Design, Financing and Construction Control
Influencing the final project design and financing always is an
important goal of the community developer since it is central to the goal
of community participation and affordable housing development. In some
cases, the community developer will complete, or nearly complete, the
final design before the private developer is involved, such as IBA's pro-
ject in the South End, and in Marcus Garvey Gardens in Roxbury. In these
projects the community developer will want to retain some review over con-
struction and design changes. IBA, as managing general partner, succeeded
in having control over any changes during construction. RAP, as a special
limited partner, did not.
In 808 Memorial Drive, RCCC succeeded in changing the projects
financing and rental structure, but was unable to achieve some of its de-
sign objectives -- namely reducing the height of the building and putting
the parking garage underground. In the Brightwood joint venture, an im-
portant concern of the community developer was to retain both the market-
rate and the subsidized portion of the development, even though the market-
rate project was more risky because of the uncertain revenues. Brightwood
Development Corporation feared that its private partner would attempt to
drop the more risky component, and this caused considerable friction be-
tween the two partners. In the end, both projects were financed and
completed, due in part to BDC's insistance on adhering to the original
development proposals.
Management and Long-term Control
Control over post-construction management, and sale or refinancing
of the project is extremely important for some community developers.
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Concerns usually focus around the issues of tenant selection for initial
rent-up, selection and control over the management agent, the authority
to fire the manager if determined unsatisfactory, and control over the
eventual sale of the project.
Inquilinos Boricas en Accion, a former tenant organization, placed
great emphasis on management control, and as the managing general partner
in Rehab I was able to achieve all of its ovjectives by hiring its own
management affiliate, ETC Management. Other joint ventures have not af-
forded such a great degree of management control to community developers.
In the Brightwood project, the private developer has more direct control
over the management operations and policies as managing general partner.
After BDC becomes the managing general partner (following final syndication
payments in February, 1986) it will have complete control over management,
sale and refinancing of the project. This long-term control was BDC's
greatest concern, whereas the rpivate developer wanted to ensure the com-
pletion of syndication payments, and through this arrangement both partners
were largely satisfied.
In both Marcus Garvey Gardens and 808 Memorial Drive, the community
developers as special limited partners achieved very little control over
management and resale although RAP did have some influence over tenant
selection. 14 In 808 Memorial Drive, the community developer actually had
little interest in strongly controlling management, since the organization
had only recently formed and was more concerned about continuing other
developments.
It is worth noting that management decisions are not totally in
the control of the joint venture partners, which to some extent reduces
the importance of management control for the community developer. In
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projects financed by MHFA, the* agency must approve any major changes in
management including rent levels and budgets, management agent, reserve
funds, etc..15 Even if the community partner had no management authority,
MHFA (or HUD, if applicable) would not allow rent increases to market
rates on subsidized units. This, in fact, was a major reason why RAP was
willing to cede management control to the private developer; RAP's direc-
tor was willing to cede management control to the private developer; RAP's
director was confident that MHFA's management policies would strongly
reflect RAP's own concerns.16
Summary of Community Developer Roles
These variables present a rather thorough description of community
developer roles in joint ventures, and the degrees of success community
developers have had in achieving their goals of control and financial ben-
ifits. Based on the four joint ventures described earlier, it it apparent
that a wide range of roles exists, and that each joint venture has many
unique characteristics resulting from the community developer's goals,
the private developer's interests in the project, the influence of financial
institutions such as MHFA, and the characteristics of the housing project
itself. It is possible, however, to make some generalizations about com-
munity roles in joint ventures, and how conflicts between the partners
are resolved, based on these and other examples.
The Managing Partner Role 17
This is the most powerful community developer role, and is largely
described by the managing general partner position, such as taken by IBA
in Rehab I. In this position, the community developer is almost completely
responsible for the development and requires a private developer partner
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only for the purposes of meeting net worth requirements and providing
investor security for equity syndication. The community developer will
have complete control over design and financing, and nearly complete
control over management and the long-term future of the project. Syndi-
cation shares will typically be over 50 percent for the community devel-
oper, net all fees but with corresponding liability for overruns and
operating deficits.
The private partner receives a fee for providing the net worth
and sharing liability, but otherwise is very passive in the development.
The conflict between the community developer and the private developer
around control issues is largely resolved in this case because the commu-
nity developer holds the bulk of control and liability while essentially
purchasing the private developer's net worth qualifications.
The managing partner role for community developers is unfortunately
not common, and appears to be even less so in recent years. Since in most
cases the private developer must contribute some cash to the project (such
as large finance fees) and accept some liability, they are reluctant to
turn over so much control to the community partner. The circumstances
resulting in such a strong community developer position are discussed
further in Chapter V. It is worth noting, however, that there are other
examples of community developers as managing general partners. One such
joint venture is the United Front Homes development in New Bedford. The
community group, United Front, had been designated the developer of an
urban renewal parcel in the West End of New Bedford in 1972. With the
help of development consultants, United Front organized the development
team, including the architects, lawyer, and contractor, and worked closely
with MHFA for financing and subsidies.18 After deciding to use a limited
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dividend sponsorship they sought a "net worth partner" as part of the
syndication package, and eventually formed a limited partnership with
National Housing Partnerships, (a federally chartered corporation which
specialized in partnerships with community organizations). United Front
received the bulk of syndication proceeds and retained managing general
partner status. It also carried a substantial amount of liability for
the project and paid up-front expenses including closing costs, letters
of credit, and any costs not covered by the mortgage loan.
The Community Support/Limited Partner Role 19
The 808 Memorial Drive joint venture illustrates a minimal role
for community developers in a joint venture. Riverside/Cambridgeport
Community Corporation was able to substantially influence the project's
design and financing in exchange for providing community support, but had
very little involvement in ongoing development decisions and no management
control. In the community support role, the community developer has input
into certain decisions which affect the community, but no jurisdiction
beyond those limited areas of control. The private developer protects
his or her interests by retaining control over most decisions, and a cor-
respondingly large share of syndication and liability. The community
developer's syndication share :is;rel.atively -small, siuch -as RCC's 10 percent,
and there may be no liability at all. The special limited partnership
position formalizes the community developer's support r ole (ie. a partner
in the development) but also its minimal control and share of syndication.
A more detailed example of the community support role is presented
in Chapter VI. Fenway CDC joined Westland Avenue Associates, Frank Keefe
being the principle developer, with the main purpose of providing community
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support to the project. In the end, the community group used its community
support role to extract certain goals from the development that would not
have been aChieved without its participation as a partner.
An important characteristic of this minimal role is that the pro-
ject is typically initiated by the. private developer rather than the
community developer, as is the case in other joint ventures. As is dis-
cussed further in the following chapter, the community developer's role
in initiating the project is extremely important in determining its ulti-
mate role in the joint venture partnership.
Major Partner Roles
The managing general role is unattainable for most community devel-
opers, is often not acceptable from the community developer's view. What
roles for community developers lie between these extremes, where a community
developer can be a major partner in the development short of being the
managing general? Unfortunately, while the strongest and weakest roles
fcr community developers seem fairly well defined, the possibilities in
between are numerous and not so easily classified.
Brightwood Housing Associates illustrates a major partner role,
where the community developer has control over several key issues in the
development but relinquishes day-to-day development activities to the
private developer. BDC, while not the managing general partner, has an
"equal voice" over critical decisions including construction changes,
management hiring and firing, and sale or refinancing. Similarly, RAP
had a major role in Marcus Garvey Gardens, including full responsibility
for the development almost until initial closing, negotiating substantial
minority hiring goals, and receiving over 50 percent of the syndication
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proceeds, even though it ultimately had no management control. These two
joint ventures, as well as others, suggest that community developers can
have signficant control over a project short of being the managing general
partner.
One partnership concept that is attractive to community developers
is co-development, ie. a co-general partnership position and a 50/50 de-
cision making process. Unfortunately, co-development may not be a realistic
joint venture model given the potential conflicts between the community
and private developers. Both RAP and BDC sought co-general partner status
with their private developers but with only minimal success. BDC and its
partner operated on a co-developer understanding until the initial closing
when the private developer made a major financial commitment and acquired
liability. At that point, the developer insisted on the managing general
position throughout the syndication period when its profits are most at
risk. In Marcus Garvey Gardens, upon seeking a co-developer partner, RAP
found that no private developers were willing to share control with the
community organization during construction and management. Co-development
implies that the community developer will have an equal voice in all major
decisions would slow the development down, possibly raising construction
costs where the private developer has liability, and jeopardizing the syn-
dication proceeds. Brightwood Development Corporation and the MB Group
were able to resolve this problem by giving BDC veto power over certain
decisions, described above, and eventually full managing control.
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CHAPTER V
FACTORS DETERMINING THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPER'S PARTNERSHIP ROLE
Drawing upon the four joint ventures descrived in Chapter 4, and
the different community roles each represents, it is possible to define
several key factors which determine a community developer's role in a
joint venture. A fairly thorough set of factors is described below, al-
though the categories are in some ways arbitrary and the factors are highly
interdependent. The community developer's financial and development
resources are strongly related to its role in initiating the project,
which relates to its political strength, and so on. With this interdepen-
dence, it is difficult to isolate the effect of one particular factor, or
to say that one factor was chiefly responsible for a community developer's
position.
Furthermore, each joint venture has many unique characteristics,
such as the effect of particular individuals on the negotiations, so that
it is really not possible to descrive the complete set of factors that
determine a joint venture partnership. This complexity notwithstanding,
a relationship between several common factors and the community developer's
role can be established, even if clouded somewhat by the complexity of
each joint venture.
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Project Initiation
The community developer's role in initiating the project is perhaps
the most important factor influencing its ultimate role in the partnership,
if only because the initiating role so strongly affects other resources
controlled by the community cbveloper. Thus, joint ventures can be rather
simplistically divided into two types according to the community organiza-
tion's role in the early stages of the project.
Community initiated projects are usually conceived and brought
initial planning and design by the community developer. At some later
stage of development, the private developer is brought into the process
for purposes of financing, syndication, construction and management. Most
joint ventures are of this type, including all of IBA's projects, Brightwood
Housing Associates and Marcus Garvey Gardens discussed in this report.
Privately initiated projects, in contrast, are usually conceived
and initially planned by a private developer, and the community developer
is brought in to provide community support for the project. The community
developer may end up contributing other resources to the project (such
as equity and staff time), but their participation is based primarily on
political strength. 808 Memorial Drive is the best example of this type
of joint venture, where RCCC became a partner in the development after
initially organizing community opposition against it. Westland Avenue
Associates, described in the second part of this report, is also a largely
private initiated joint venture.
Both 808 Memorial Drive and Westland Avenue Associates suggest
that community developers have a relatively minor role in privately init-
iated developments, basically corresponding to the community sponsor/li-
mited partner with little control over construction and management, and
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only a 10 percent syndication share. This is in contrast to major partner
or managing partner roles taken by other community developers. If these
two joint ventures are an accurate indication, a strong partnership posi-
tion, including management control and a large syndication share, does
not seem possible if the community developer did not have an important
role in the projects conception and planning.
The major reason for this, clearly, is that community developers
will usually have a weaker negotiating position in privately initiated
projects because their strength results largely from political controls
and the threat of community opposition, rather than control over land
and preliminary designs. Furthermore, it could be argued that in privately
initiated joint ventures, community developers do not have the opportunity
to negotiate with more than one private developer, a strategy used rather
successfully in several community initiated joint ventures.
Political Strength
The community development groups discussed here have differing
levels of political strength, usually reflecting the. level-of support
that the group has in the community it serves and its ability to organize
that support around housing development issues in the area. Not necessar-
ily related is the community organizations support with key political
actors, such as city hall or HUD officials.
Political strength is used by community developers to obtain
other resources crucial to housing development, such as site control or
subsidy commitments. The Emergency Tenant's Council (later IBA) trans-
formed a well organized Puerto Rican tenant group into a politically strong
community developer able to influence the city's urban renewal plans. 1
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The result was that ETC became the designated developer (including a land
writedown) for a large parcel of land and buildings in the South End. 2
Without this first, critical step ETC could never have become the managing
partner in Rehab I.
Community developers must also rely on political strength to sub-
stitute for other disadvantages in the development process. The value of
a community developer's offer of community support is proportional to the
organization's strength in the community. Again, 808 Memorial Drive is
perhaps the best illustration of the value of political strength in a joint
venture, where RCCC used its influence over the Cambridhe Planning Board
to gain control over the project. Another example is the Tent City Task
Force. In its negotiations with a potential partner, TCTF listed among
its contributions to the partnership: "Organization of community support
for the project essential to approval of applications" for several sources
of subsidy; and "communication of community support for the development
and for the partnership before political and financial institutions inclu-
ding BRA, City of Boston, MHFA, HUD, etc."3 Unfortunately, Tent City Task
Force's offer of community support was not particularly strong because of
the political divisions within the South End community, (and perhaps its
lack of support from City Hall) which severely detracted from its negoti-
ating strength.
Organizational Stability
Organizational stability -- defined by a reasonably stable and
devoted board of directors, dedicated staff, some financial assets and
a previous development record -- is essential for a community developer
seeking a major role in a joint development. Organizational stability is
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particularly important in obtaining financial commitments and equity
syndication. Finance agencies and syndicators will view reasonably stable
and financially secure organizations much more favorably and are-more
likely to accept a stronger partnership position for such groups. Con-
versely, financing agents and syndicators will seek to limit the role of
an organization they veiw as instable.
This factor is perhaps best illustrated by comparing Brightwood
Development Corporation and the Roxbury Action Program and their respective
joint venture roles. BDC successfully used its organizational stability
and reputation, including a previous record in commercial and housing
development snd the affiliation of several public redevelopment and housing
officials ot obtain local political support and preliminary commitments
on the UDAG and Section 8 subsidies. In contrast RAP's lack of stability --
and particularly its financial insolvency --.. worked against it with both
MHFA and negotiations with prospective private developer partners.
Resources Provided by Each Partner
The resources brought into the project by each partner has a very
direct effect on their relative bargaining strength in the partnership.
That is to say, community developers that can provide several important
pieces in the development can take a stronger role in the project. These
resources will typically include:
-control over land and/or buildings, including ownership, options
to purchase, designated developer or acquisition writedown;
-financial resources invested in the project, including up-front
costs for planning and design, engineering studies, financing
fees, etc;
-preliminary financing and subsidy commitments, such as those
obtained from MHFA for financing, or HUD for Section rent subsidy
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allocations;
-development skills and reputatuon, including design andimanage-
ment skills, "connections" to obtain financing and subsidies,
completing technical applications, obtaining local building
approvals, and legal skills. Community developers frequently
have technical assistance consultants which they contribute to
the project.
Consider the differences in development resources provided by BDC,
as a major partner in Brightwood Housing Associates, and RCCC as a commu-
nity support partner in 808 Memorial Drive. BDC provided:4 purchase
options for nearly sixty lots on which the development was planned, costing
$25,000; community and city political support for the project; a completed
UDAG application and preliminary approval from HUD; preliminary approval
for Section 8 subsidies and 221(d)(4) mortgage insurance; and a $135,000
loan from the Massachusetts Community Development Finance Corporation
(CDFC) for up-front development costs including architecture fees, appli-
cation fees and permits. BDC's private partner, the MB Group, provided
experience with large-scale Section 8 developments, paid GNMA finance and
closing fees totalling nearly $1 million in cash and credit requirements;
provided net worth for the limited partnership and security for investors.
RCCC, by supporting the altered development proposal, provided
the local permit approvals necessary to proceed.5 The community group
also provided some development and architectural experience to the project,
and helped secure MHFA financing. The private developer, Zena Nemetz,
had purchased the land through a complicated site assembly process, pro-
vided complete architectural drawings and paid all up-front and closing
fees.
Providing development resources such as land and financial assets
are essential for a community developer to retain a strong partnership
position. These resources affect the negotiating position of the Community
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developer in two basic ways. First, it affects the degree to which the
community developer must rely on the private developer's continued parti-
cipation in the project. If all that is needed is to meet net worth and
reputation requirements, the community developer can more easily shop
around and negotiate for the best offer. The private developer's threat
to leave the project is not as potent as when they have also secured the
subsidies and financing. IBA, in several of its joint ventures, was able
to negotiate such favorable positions largely because they were not depended
on one particular private developer.
A developer will also expect the degree to which he or she controls
the project and financial benefits to be in proportion to investment and
liability in the project. Thus, private developers will seek to protect
a substantial investment of time and money by limiting the powers of the
community partner, and taking a greater proportion of syndication proceeds
as well. If the community developer can contribute a larger share of de-
velopment resources (and thus take greater risk), the private developer
will be willing to accept a smaller syndication share. Similarly, the
Tent City Task Force found that private developers would offer a lower
syndication amount if the community group insisted on taking no liability
for cost overruns.6
Influence of Outside Actors
Chapter II discussed the constraints placed on community developers
by financial institutions, government agencies, and equity syndicators,
referred to here as outside actors because they are not direct partners
in the joint venture, yet their actions and attitudes may strongly influence
the partnership, and in some cases government agencies or equity syndicators
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will more directly influence the terms of the partnership.
Net worth, working capital, and development reputation require-
ments by government agencies are difficult for community developers to
meet, and as discussed earlier, are a major reason for joint venturing
with a private developer. Thus, the strictness of these requirements will
partly determine the resources required from the private developer, and
similarly affect their relative strength in the partnership. The adop-
tion of net worth requirements by MHFA, for example, precipitated the need
for a private developer in Marcus Garvey Gardens. Prior to 1977, and the
development of many of these requirements, the project received a prelim-
inary commitment from MHFA with RAP as the sole general partner. After
some delays and resubmission of the mortgage application in 1977, it was
approved under the condition that RAP co-venture with a financially strong
partner, based largely on the 20 percent net worth requirement, and RAP's
lack of large development experience.
Faced with these requirements, the project was ultimately built
with Macomber Construction as the general partner, providing the net worth
and taking most of the risk, and RAP becoming a "nominal limited partner",
with a very small role in the project after initial closing.8 This shift
in developer status for RAP cannot be totally attributed to new MHFA re-
quirements, since RAP was becoming increasingly instable as its debts grew,
but the requirements were one barrier to RAP acting as a sole general
partner.
Furthermore, these requirements are not rigidly set, and there
is considerable discretion on the agency's part for determining eligibility
for subsidy or financing commitments. Referring again to MHFA threshold
requirements, the developer must demonstrate "sufficidnt experience" and
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"sufficient financial resources" to complete the project, and the net
worth requirement ranges from 15 to 20 percint; clearly leaving the agency
some flexibility in applyihg their regulations.9 The importance of this
flexibility for community developers is that agencies controlling the
project's financing can influence the community developer's negotiating
strength by their discretionary judgements of development capacity.
MHFA has also more directly influenced joint venture partnerships
by stating the roles it expects to be taken by the respective partners.
The mortgage officer for Marcus Garvey Gardens explained the basic reason-
ing: "MHFA is really lending to the pro developer. It is in (MHFA's)
interest for (the private developer) to have control over the project."10
Thus, while MHFA considers it beneficial to have community support for a
project, the preferred model is for the community group to have a limited
partnership position with little control , and the private developer as
managing general partner. This model is exemplified by Marcus Garvey
Gardens with RAP and Macomber Development, and several other joint ventures
financed by MHFA.
Equity syndicators have a similar preference against community
developers being general partners. They are particularly concerned about
leaving decision making power to instable groups that may not exist for
the life of the partnership, forcing the partnership agreement to be re-
written with another general partner taking responsibility. Fearing that
investors will pay less for the equity shares and that the project will
be more difficult to syndicate, equity syndicators will typically offer
lower net proceeds if the community developer takes a general partner
position.11  Thus, because of the syndicator's perceived increase in the
project's risk, community developers may have to accept a lower syndication
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payment if they become a general partner with significant control over
the project.
The 808 Memorial Drive partnership illustrates the importance of
outside actors in a privately initiated joint venture, since the support
of the Cambridge Planning Board and the City Council was essential to RCCC's
community support role. Similarly, Westland Avenue Associates also illus-
trates the impact of local and federal agencies on a community developer's
role in a joint venture.
Negotiating Ability of the Partners and their Agents
This is perhaps the most difficult of the factors to isolate, yet
it is clearly critical in the negotiations between community and private
developers. Whereas the previous factors all focused on what each partner
brings to the negotiations, or "what do I have and what can I offer", ne-
gotiating ability is "knowing what I can get and how to get it". Community
developers may be at a disadvantage in this respect, particularly when
dealing with a private developer with more experience in negotiating joint
venture business agreements. Inexperienced negotiators may not be familiar
with examples of strong community partner positions and not aware of the
legal subtleties involved in limited partnerships, and as a result will
have difficulty presenting the partnership position that best serves their
interests. Private developers, usually with the benefit of experienced
lawyers, will likely have very precise ideas of their desired partnership
position.
One way for community developers to improve their negotiating
skills is to hire experienced negotiating agents. In several of the pro-
jects discussed in this report, community organizations had assistance
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from housing professionals in their negotiations with private developers.
United Front Homes' negotiation with National Housing Partnerships were
assisted by Jim Stockard, now a housing consultant to many community or-
ganizations. Greater Boston Community Development (GBCD) also acted as
negotiating agent for many joint ventures, including most of IBA's projects
in the South End.
Outside consultants can help by clarifying the community developer's
role in the partnership and its ovjectives for the project. GBCD negoti-
ates with the private developer with a very specific joint venture model
in mind -- community developer as managing general partner, and private
developer as a "net worth" partner -- and they are able to demonstrate
several projects where this model has worked. GBCD will typically write
the limited partnership agreement and package the syndication offering as
well, further adding to their strength as a negotiator. IBA's managing
general position cannot be totally attributed to GBCD's negotiating ability,
because GBCD projects usually have a stronger negotiating position in the
first place, by virtue of being community initiated projects with strong
financial and organizational backing.
Another point emphasized by outside consultants is an orderly and
well documented negotiation process. One problem frequently encountered
in joint venture negotiation is misunderstanding's around unwritten or
vaguely written agreements. In the Brightwood joint venture, for example,
BDC and MB had an unwritten agreement regarding the community developer's
status as a co-general partner. Austin Miller, of BDC understood the a-
greement to mean his 'organization would be a co-developer throughout the
project, including construction and management. Steve Rioff, of MB, inter-
preted the co-developer status to last until closing, when MB would become
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the managing general. Miller had agreed to a smaller share of syndication
(25 percent, rather than the original 40 percint proposed) on the under-
standing that BDC would be a co-general partner indefinitely, and later
found that he had traded away the financial benefits for unsatisfactory
community control. There was no documentation of this agreement, and the
different understandings caused tremendous conflict between the partners.
This is not to say that outside consultants are necessary for a
community developer to have a strong negotiating position, but certain
negotiating techniques are vital, including negotiating with several de-
velopers, where possible, to seek the best offer and the most compatible
developer; clearly documenting agreements; clearly defining community goals
for the project and the expected partnership positions, and knowing of
precedents for that position.
Summary of Factors Determining Partnership Roles
Chapter IV presented three basic joint venture roles for community
developers: as managing general partners, the community developer has
primary responsibility and control over the project; as a major partner,
the community developer has a principal role in planning the development
and perhaps a role during management, but concedes much of the daily de-
velopmentand management control to the private developer; as a community
support partner, the community developer has influence over the planning
stage but has a minimal role beyond that point.
This chapter suggests that there are several common factors in all
joint ventures which largely determine the community developer's role in
the partnership, although the unique aspects of each must also be considered
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The relationship between these factors and the joint venture roles can
be summarized as follows.
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Community Developers as Managing Partners
* Requires a strongly community initiated project, allowing the
community developer to define the project and control critical
development resources, particularly site control.
* Requires strong political support and a stable organizational base.
* Community Developer provides nearly all development resources except
net worth andreputation, accepting a large share of liability as well.
* Key outside actors are highly supportive of community developer's managing
position and objectives for the development.
* Often use outside consultants to provide technical assistance and
act as negotiators, resulting in a well defined community role, and an
orderly negotiating process.
Community Developers as Major Partners
* Community initiated project, allowing the community developer to
define the project and control major development resuuYces.
* Political and organizational strength varies. Strength in these
areas will lead to a better position within this role (ie. Brightwood)
and conversely, lack of support and stability will reduce the
end partnership role (ie. Marcus Garvey Gardens).
* Community developer provides major part of the development resources,
except larger financial needs and accepts- little -liability.
e Outside actors are generally supportive of the project but may
influence partner roles by preventing a managing position for the
community developer.
* Frequently lack a clear model of partnership roles and rely on
unwritten agreements which result in ambiguous control by community
developer and tension between partners.
Community Developer as Community Support Partner
* Privately initiated projects, where community developer is attempting
to alter project largely through political resources.
9 Political strength is a necessity and determines the community
developer's strength within this role. Organizational stability is
lacking, preventing the community developer from initiating its own projects.
* Community developer provides few resources other than political support.
Also accepts little or no liability.
e Outside actors are critical to community developer's strength within
the community support role.
s Also may lack a clear partnership model, similar to Major Partners.
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Joint Venture Strategies for Community Developers
How can community developers strengthen their roles in joint
venture developments? The approach usually taken by community developers
is to develop the most advantageous negotiating position through political,
organizational and financial resources; precisely those factors indicated
by the previous analysis. This might include developing a strong organiza-
tional base, seeking grants for up-front development costs, and persuading
public officials to support the community group's efforts. But unfortu-.
nately, most of the factors which influence a community developer's role
are only partially, or even minimally in its control. Development resources
are not always available through grants and loans, and public officials
cannot always be persuaded. Some factors may be completely out of the
community's control, as when the private developer already has site control.
This strategy -- enhancing the community developer's resources -- though
necessary, has its definite limitations.
Furthermore, the Brightwood and Marcus Garvey Gardens joint ven-
tures are discouraging in that the community developers in both cases had
site control and had committed substantial resources toward the development,
but were unable to achieve the desired partnership role. How could these
community developers have worked more effectively with the resources that
they had?
Given their existing resources and the few aspects of the devel-
opment process which they can influence, community developers need a
strategy for entering into and negotiating in joint ventures. A joint
venture strategy, the beginnings of which are described below, describes
several decisions facing community developers in joint ventures that can
be acted on early in the process, thereby improving the community developer's
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negotiating strength in the partnership.
1. Timing the Joint Venture to Maximize Community Developer Resources
Community developers should focus, whenever possible, on initiat-
ing projects and completing most of the pre-development planning before
seeking a joint venture partner. From the previous discussion it is
clear that a strong initiating role is essential for community developers
to have a major role in the partnership, primarily because initiating the
project results in site control and other development resources. The best
way to improve the community developer's negotiating position, therefore,
is to complete pre-development work, including site acquisition, feasi-
bility and design work, financing and subsidy commitments as the sole
project developer. By doing so, the community developer establishes defin-
ate control over these resources, and can then negotiate with several
private developers for a correspondingly strong partnership role and syn-
dication share. In short, the community developer should delay the involve-
ment of the private developer for as long as possible without jeopardizing
the project.
This is essentially the approach taken by Greater Boston Community
Development in the joint ventures for which it acted as a techincal advisor.
As IBA's Rehab I illustrates, GBCD tries to maintain the sole community
developer until as close to initial closing as possible, and reduce depen-
dence on the private developer's resources to net worth and reputation
only. 12
The obstacle to this development strategy, aside from cases where
the community developer enters a privately initiated project, is the high
up-front development costs often associated with larger pro.iects.
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Community developers usually rely on uncertain loans and grants to initi-
ate projects and pay up-front costs, which becomes insufficient at some
point in the development process. In the Brightwood joint venture, the
GNMA financing fee of nearly $160,000 was impossible for the community
developer to cover.
Yet, the Briqhtwood project also illustrates a case where the
private developer's involvement could have been delayed. Austin Miller,
Director of Brightwood Development Corporation, felt that the large finan-
cial and net worth requirements were the major reason for seeking a joint
venture partner for the project, although the developer's experience with
Section 8 projects would also be valuable.13 The joint venture was formed
in Sprinq, 1980, after initial planninq work by BDC but before substantial
pre-development work had been completed, includinq architectural and leqal
14
work and completinq financinq applications. The community developer
ended up fundinq the bulk of these expenses throuqh a loan, and the private
developer's first major expense, the GNMA fee, was not required until more
than a year later in April, 1981.15 During that period, the private de-
veloper had acquired a managing general partner role and 75 percent of
net syndication proceeds. Had BDC felt confident enouqh to continue with
pre-development activities alone -- and in this case HUD was not pressuring
BDC to find an experienced partner -- the final partnership might have
been quite different.
2. Deciding the Community Developer's Role in Advance
Before entering a joint ventura2, community developers should de-
cide what partnership role is both desirable and possible, and clarify
its specific objectives for the joint venture. When negotiating with a
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private developer, as mentioned earlier, it is important to have an unam-
biguous position on the most crucial aspects of the joint venture and to
specify that position as a condition on the partnership. The community
developer should therefore consider each of the following areas. The de-
tails of each are described earlier in Chapter IV.
Partnership Position: Decide on the preferred position in the
limited partnership, ie. managing general partner, another general partner
position, or a special limited partner position, and the division of respon-
sibilities that are to accompany that position.
Specific Areas of Control: Decide on the most crucial control
issues for the community, such as unit design or ongoing management, and
seek specific control over them. If a managing partner position is not
possible, this is likely to be a good approach to achieving the greatest
specific goals. The co-developer model, theoretically giving the community
developer equal control over all decisions, has proven very difficult to
achieve. Instead most community developers have maintained control over
specific decisions of greatest concern.
Resources Contributed by Each Partner: Clarify the resources to
be contributed by each partner, including financial, staff time and skill,
developer reputation, and political support. Ideally, this can be deter-
mined before entering the joint venture so that the resources required
from the private developer are clearly known in advance. In the joint
venture agreement, it should be clear which partner is responsible for
obtaining final commitments and permits, and covering future costs, etc..
Similarly, liability should be specified.
Distribution of Syndication Proceeds: A community developer should
decide on its justifiable share of syndication proceeds. This can be
72
approached in several ways, and perhaps the least arbitrary method is to
place a value on the respective resources provided by each partner. This
involves putting a financial value on non-financial items, which is made
somewhat easier by comparing them. For example, how valuable is community
support necessary for public approvals in comparison with development
reputation and net worth needed for syndication? Another approach is to
have a specific sum in mind, perhaps an amount necessary to start another
development or fund the organization for a year.
3. Creating A Definite Decision-making Role For The Community Developer
After the community developer has clarified its preferred role in
the joint venture internally, it it important to make this role clear to
the private developer through definite and written agreements. More con-
crete aspects of a partnership, such as the share of net proceeds to each
partner, or the financial responsibilities of each partner, are more easily
put into writing than decision-making roles. In the Brightwood case,
financial responsibilities and syndication were well understood by both
partners, but the ambiguity in BDC's decision role resulted in considerable
losses from the community developer's point of view. In contrast, Rehab I
created a very specific decision role for the private developer, so that
his only control over the project would follow major operating deficits.
Thus, it is extremely important for community developers to negotiate clear
decision-making roles early in the partnership, to ensure that if conflicts
arise at a later date there will be at least some basis for including the
community developer in the resolution of that conflict.
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4. Negotiating for Control AND Profits
Community developers have sometimes negotiated under the somewhat
false assumption that private developers are willing to trade control for
extra profits, and that the community developer can therefore offer the
private developer a larger syndication share in exchange for more control
to the community. The community developer, putting more value on the
control than the proceeds, is willing to make this trade and assumes that
the private developer will also. The joint ventures examined in this
report, and the more general interests of private developers discussed
in Chapter III, suggest that this is not really possible, and that more
accurately, control, proceeds, and liability generally occur together.
Retaining greater control results in a larger share of syndication and
corresponding liability. To the private developer, control is necessary
to protect his or her investment and to ensure the syndication proceeds.
Private developers will be willing to share control only if their invest-
ment is substantially reduced -- through greater investment by the commu-
nity developer -- or by reduced liability, but not simply by offering a
larger syndication share which is put at risk by community control.
Quickly considering the joint venture roles illustrates this
point. As a managing partner, the community developer has the greatest
control, the largest share of syndication, and the most liability. As a
community support partner, the community developer has the least control,
the smallest share of syndication, and the least liability. Marcus Garvey
Gardens appears to be an anomaly, but even in this case there was no
tradeoff between control and profits. The Roxbury Action Program negoti-
ated with several private developers, none of whom were willing to give
74
RAP a strong general partner position. 17 RAP essentially sold the devel-
opment package to the best offer, Macomber Development.
Community developers should be aware of the relationship between
control, proceeds, and liability, and not attempt to "purchase" control
with greater syndication proceeds. Instead, community developers should
seek to reduce the private developer's involvement in the project -- both
in terms of investment and control simultaneously -- and to negotiate for
a major share of control AND profits.
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CHAPTER VI
WESTLAND AVENUE ASSOCIATES: THE EFFECT OF INNOVATIVE
FINANCING ON A JOINT VENTURE PARTNERSHIP
Introduction
Westland Avenue Associates is considerably different from the
joint ventures mentioned thus far. Most important is the complicated and
unusual financing structure of the project. The 97 unit apartment complex
is heavily subsidized from a variety of federal and local programd, includ-
ing low-interest financing, Section 8, and a $2 million Urban Development
Action Grant (UDAG). Yet, despite these heavy subsudies, the project is
heavily dependent on the market-rate rental component. A whole set of
development issues and conflicts between the community and private developer
partners arise out of this complicated financing and the market-rate
component. The most crucial issue from the community developer's point
of view is how to extract community benefits from the project given
the necessity of the market component. This is in contrast to other
projects where many of the community benefits were more fixed, as in
Marcus Garvey Gardens which had secured 100 percent Section 8 subsidies.
The Westland Avenue project takes place during a period when
housing subsidies and financing were being reduced, and although the sub-
sidies were not as scarce as they are today, the present difficulties of
housing development were beginning to emerge. In the Notice of Fund
Availibility which the developers responded to, (a pool of Section 8 units
for which HUD solicits proposals? only 200 Section 8 units were allocated
to Massachusetts, and projects which relied solely on Section 8 guarantees
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were not favored. Furthermore, the rent levels proveded by Section 8 sub-
sidies, so-called fair market rents, were frequently not large enough to
support real project costs, as is the case in both the Bright wood and
Westland Avenue projects which required UDAG writedowns of project costs.
Westland Avenue is therefore particularly interesting because it is s
joint venture which takes place within the context of shrinking subsidies,
and the project's financing has very definite effects on the community-
private partnership. Fenway Community Development Corporation was con-
stantly faced with the dilemma of its involvement in :a market-rate project
that would contribute to displacement in the neighborhood. The private
developer faces greater risk than a conventional Section 8 project. As
is detailed in a later discussion, FCDC and the private developers had
very different priorities for the allocation of subsidies and the manage-
ment of the complicated rent structure. By looking closely at the Westland
Avenue partnership, the effect of innovative financing techinques and the
role of public agencies, it it possible to explore some of the implications
of subsidy cutbacks on joint venture developments.
The role of the Fenway Community Development Corporation (FCDC)
in Westland Avenue Associates is similar to the community support partner
position, as taken by RCCC in 808 Memorial Drive. FCDC provided relatively
few financial resources, but instead relied heavily on its ability to in-
fluence public officials who controlled the many subsidy allocations and
approvals. Prior to Westland Avenue, FCDC had not completed a major de-
velopment project, and the fledgling orgainzation entered the partnership
with a variety of goals, not the least of which was to enhance its repu-
tation as a successful community developer. Other goals included providing
family housing for low and moderate income households, ensuring a substantial
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"moderate rent" component and reducing the secondary displacement effects
of the project, and including a solar heated building as part of the design.
These multiple goals were achieved to varying degrees, as is discussed in
more detail later, but perhaps the greatest disappointment to FCDC members
was the high degree of conflict that arose between themselves and their
private developer partners. In the disagreements around the use of sub-
sidies and rent structure, FCDC quickly took a tenant advocacy position
which caused a division between the community and private developers.
The conflicts were difficult for all those involved, and ultimately det-
rimental to FCDC's reputation as a developer. In examining the Westland
Avenue joint venture, it will be important to consider which conflicts
could be avoided and how, or alternatively, which conflicts seem unavoid-
able and likely to occur in future partnerships.
A description of the Westland Avenue joint venture follows, pre-
senting in roughly chronological order the evolution of the project, the
context in which the partners were operating, and the negotiations and
conflicts between the partners. After this is a more thorough analysis
of the case, the partnership's conflicts, and FCDC's role in the joint
venture. The concluding section explores some ways that FCDC might have
taken a stronger role in the development, and the implication of Westland
Avenue on future community-private joint ventures.
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Westland Avenue Associates
Background and Formation of Westland Ave Associates
The Fenway is a residential neighborhood which has undergone
tremendous changes in the last several decades. Like many Boston neigh-
borhoods, the Fenway's housing stock has been gradually deteriorating since
World War II1. Residential housing in the Fenway is almost entirely com-
posed of large, row-house apartment buildings, and the population is over-
whelmingly renters. As long-time residents moved from the Fenway and
institutions such as Northeastern University began expanding, the housing
stock rapidly declined.
While urban renewal caused a net loss of units between 1960 and
1970, the schools enrollments expanded dramatically. Speculative
landlords subdivided family-sized units to take advantage of the
influx of students needing only studio or one-bedroom apartments.
With the Fenway population tending toward a more transient tenancy
some landlords began 'milking' their properties collecting rents
while letting the building fall into disrepair.
But starting in the early 1970's, after the student population
leveled off and vacant housing units became frequent, the Fenway developed
a particularly acute problem - arson. Westland Avenue, in the heart of
the Fenway was among the hardest hit. Between 1973 and 1977, thirty
buildings were completely burned on Westland Avenue and the adjacent
Symphony Road.3 Five people were killed in fires on Westland Avenue,
and the street became a symbol of the Fenway's arson problem.
The fires rekindled several community organizations which already
existed in the Fenway from previous battles-against urban. renewal and
institutional expansion. The Symphony Tenants Organizing Project, (STOP)
in an attempt to end the fires, began researching the ownership patterns
of the burned buildings.4 Their efforts culminated in the indictment of
33 persons connected to an arson-for-profit ring, and the passage of State
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anti-arson legislation in July, 1978.5
After the fires ceased, the Fenway was left with a large number
of burned abandoned and boarded-up buildings. Some were rebuilt as sub-
sidized housing units, almost all of which are one-bedroom units for the
elderly.6 A very small number of units were renovated as private rental
or cooperative units, and some buildings remain abandoned today. Until
1980, seven burned buildings on Westland Avenue were the most visible
reminders of the Fenway fires.
By the end of 1979, however, Fenway organizations no longer feared
displacement from market forces, or "gentrification". The wave of condo-
minium conversions in the Back Bay was already spreading into the Fenway.
Copley Place, a huge commercial and retail development planned on a site
adjacent to the Fenway was expected to greatly increase the demand for
Fenway housing. As rents continued to rise and vacancies decreased, com-
munity organizations such as STOP and FCDC began considering ways to
return vacant buildings to the housing stock without promoting further
gentrification. Their efforts became focused on the Westland Avenue
buildings because of their visibility and the likelihood that their de-
velopment would set the tone for future developments in the Fenway.8
The Fenway CDC had been relatively dormant for several years until
its renewed interest in Westland Avenue. Formed in 1973, it was instrumen-
tal in the subsidized renovation of six buildings in 1974, previously
slated for demolition by their owner.9 After that most of its members
efforts went into arson prevention work. In early 1979, FCDC members
actively pursued the development of two vacant buildings on Westland Ave.,
numbers 65/67 and 83. Mathew Thall was particularly active and was later
named FCDC President. FCDC secured a six month option to purchase the
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buildings and applied for a HUD Solar Demonstration Grant. They also
began negotiations with HUD officials and City officials for development
subsidies. Andrew Olins of the Mayor's Office of Housing agreed to sup-
port a 100 percent Section 8 project for the buildings if FCDC could se-
cure the subsidies. The BRA gave the fledgling project qualified support,
and the HUD regional administrator gave a preliminary commitment to assist
the project, although Section 8 subsidies were becoming increasingly
scarce.10 FCDC received a $5,000 Solar design grand and engaged Darlene
Powers to complete preliminary drawings. A $50,000 solar construction
grant was awarded in November, 1979, contingent upon FCDC purchasing the
property and obtaining financing. By this time, however, the CDC's pur-
chase option had expired. They soon discovered that another developer
had secured an option on 65/67 and 83 Westland Avenue, as well as all of
the othervacantbuOildings on the street, a total of ten addresses and
seven buildings.
Westland Avenue had not just attracted the attention of Fenway
community organizations, but of private developers as well. The buildings
had been optioned by Mario Nicosia, President of the Nicosia Development
Company which had renovated many porperties near the Fenway and Back Bay
as luxury townhouse condominiums. His partners were to be the planning
and development firm of Harrington, Keefe, and Shork (HKS). Frank Keefe,
president of HKS, had been the Director of the Massachusetts Office of
State Planning under Governor Michael Dukakis.
From the outset, Keefe's plan was to develop mixed income rental
housing in all of the vacant buildings, thus significantly improving the
neighborhood but setting a precedent for redevelopment without displacement. 12
The HUD area office had recently released a Notice of Fund Availability
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(NOFA) for Section 8 rental subsidies, giving priority to mixed income
projects with less than 20 percent of the units having Section 8 assistance.
Included in the subsidy would be GNMA "Tandem" financing, whereby the
Government National Mortgage Association provided a subsidized mortgage,
reducing the annual interest rate to 7.5 percent. Keefe's original plan
was for 117 units, a mixture of one- and two-bedroom units with 18 one-
bedroom and 4 two-bedroom units having Section 8 assistance. Rents on
the remaining units would be kept low by subsidized financing available
to Section 8 projects. Keefe felt that this proposal would compete well
for the Section 8 funds, and meet the City's mixed income housing objectives
for the Fenway.
Keefe soon discovered that several community groups in the Fenway --
FCDC in particular -- had been arranging financing and attempting to pur-
chase three of the Westland Ave. buildings. Keefe knew that community
support would improve his chances for Section 8 subsidies, since HUD had
already been contacted by community groups and preferred to stay out of
developer-community conflicts. Community support would also help obtain
the necessary City support for the project, including a 121A agreement.
He did not anticipate any opposition, however, since he "basically had a
good project" that fit many of the community groups'objectives. 13
But Frank Keefe also "believed in participation by community groups"
in development projects. 14 As the Director of the Massachusetts of State
Planning, he strongly supported the participation process in the nearby
Copley Place development, and had a reputatuon for promoting developments
that responded to local community needs. Without consulting Mario Nicosia,
Keefe proposed to Fenway CDC that they join Westland Avenue Associates,
(the development entity then composed of Nicosia and HKS) contributing
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their $50,000 solar grant to the partnership and receiving a five percent
share of syndication proceeds. HKS would receive 20 percent and Nicosia
75 percent of the proceeds. Nicosia was the sole general partner with
HKS and Fenway as limited partners.
The FCDC board considered the partnership offer, and the project
as Keefe had originally planned, and determined that it was unacceptable
for several reasons. FCDC was highly committed to providing family-sized
units (3 and 4 bedroom) in the Fenway that would be affordable to low
income people. Their original plans for 65/67 and 83 Westland Avenue in-
cluded 100 percent Section 8 subsidies, with many 3 and 4 bedroom units.
Keefe's plan included deep subsidies for mainly one-bedroom units, and
FCDC was concerned that any larger units would be unaffordable to even
moderate income families. FCDC members also wanted to ensure that the
Solar building remained in the project plans, and that their architect,
Darlene Powers of Crowley/powers Associates was retained.
Still, Keefe's desire to provide moderate income rents without
100 percent Section 8 subsidy was also appealing to FCDC. After brief
negotiations -- where Frank Keefe represented Westland Avenue Associates
and Mat Thall represented the FCDC -- an initial agreement was reached
and quickly signed. (See Appendix A)
The agreement provided for an increase in Section 8 units from 22
to 30 out of 107 total units, of which 12 would be 3 bedroom units and 8
two-bedroom units, which FCDC regarded as a "bottom line" on subsidized
family units. The solar building would be included in the design, with
Crowley/Powers as a subcontractor to Keefe's architects, and FCDC would
bring the solar grant as its financial contribution to the partnership.
The responsibilities of the three developers in this unusual
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partnership were understood as follows. Nicosia Development Co. supplied
the financial backing for the project; HKS were to package the development
and secure the subsidies and financing; and FCDC would work with the com-
munity to assure that the diverse Fenway organizations supported or at
least did not object to ,the project.
FCDC established a multitude of goals for the project and for its
involvement in the partnership. The most important goals were providing
a significant number of subsidized family units, ensuring at least 30
percent Section 8 units, maintaining non-Section 8 rents at a moderate
level, and including the solar design with subsidized family housing in
the project. The community group also wanted some control over selecting
the management agent, and input into the overall project design. Equally
as important as these goals, FCDC hoped its involvement in a major devel-
opment would enhance its reputation and strengthen the neighborhood, and
increase its visibility to the city administration and BRA officials which
would lead to further projects for the community group. A share of syndi-
cation proceeds was also important. Privately, FCDC members entered the
partnership with hesitation. They would now become associated with a major
development including "moderate" rents not yet determined, and FCDC's
role in the development and management was not certain. Nicosia was a
condominium developer, whose activities on St. Botolph Street many Fenway
organizations had opposed, and they did not trust his ultimate intentions.
In addition, FCDC feared that a total rehabilitation of the Westland Avenue
buildings was too much investment at time, and would have a major secondary
displacement effect by too rapidly removing the blight and causing a sud-
denly escalating real estate market. 15 Frank Keefe, however, had opti-
mistically projected costs that could be supported at below market rents
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and, as Thall said, "the numbers looked reasonable."
Project Financing and the Rent Moderation Program
At this point, project costs had not been finalized, and rents
could not be specified. The Fenway negotiating team (consisting of Thall
and three other FCDC Board members) wanted more specific estimates of the
non-Section 8 rents, a substantial number of which were to have moderate
rents, and as cost estimates rose, it became doubtful that the CDC's ob-
jectives for moderate rents could be achieved under the present financing
scheme. In late December, Keefe proposed that the partnership apply for
a $1.5 million Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) to cover mounting
construction costs and create a rent moderation- fund, set up as an invest-
ment with the interest being used to lower rents on certain units. The
UDAG is actually applied for by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)
and granted to the city, but HKS prepared and submitted the application.
Keefe was confident that the UDAG would be secured, since HKS had sub-
mitted six successful applications on behalf of clients previously.16
The financing for Westland Avenue Apartments was becoming quite
complicated, including multiple federal and local subsidies, and a three-
tier rent structure. The details of each program changed, but the basic
elements are as follows:
o The UDAG, originally $1.5 million and later raised to $2 million,
was to be used to support construction costs and to fund the rent modera-
tion program. Since the UDAG is actually granted to the City, it must be
loaned to Westland Ave. Associates, who then invest the funds and obtain
annual interest. Part of that interest is used to repay the City for the
UDAG over a 40 year period. Another portion is used to repay permanent
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debt service on the HUD mortgage, which cannot be supported by collected
rents. The remaining interest on the UDAG is added to the rent moderation
fund, which lowers rents on some units. After raising the UDAG to $2 mil-
lion, $225,000 was used directly by WAA to cover closing costs and financing
fees, essentially reducing cash input by the general partners. Illustration
VI-1 shows the UDAG cash flow, although the specific amounts changed as
the project progressed.
* Section 8 rental assistance for 30 units allows eligible house-
holds to pay 25 percent of their income toward rent. HUD pays the difference
between that figure and a fair market rent (also determined by HUD) to the
owner.
e Permanent financing would be provided through the GNMA tandem
program, only available to projects with Section 8 allocations. The fed-
eral government pays the difference between the below-market rate of 7.5
percent and the cost of funds to GNMA, then around 12 percent.17 Section
221(D)(4) federal mortgage insurance, whereby if the developers default
on their loans HUD will continue the loan payments, is required for the
GNMA tandem financing.
e The City of Boston must provide a 121A tax agreement which sets
the property tax rate at a percent of gross rental income, rather than
fluctuating with the tax assessment. Keefe eventually negotiated an aver-
age 12 percent tax rate for all of the units which was considered quite
favorable.
* In addition to these subsidies, the Westland Avenue Associates
partners proposed to use 20 percent of the net syndication proceeds as an
additional rent moderation pool (later reduced to 15 percent), considered
a very innovative use of' equity syndication money. Three quarters of this
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amount, or 15 percent of net syndication, was to come from the managing
general partner Mario Nicosia, and the remaining quarter, or 5 percent
of proceeds, from HKS. Thus, as originally proposed in the first UDAG
application, a rent moderation fund of $1,243,000 would be created out of
18$975,000 in UDAG funds, and $268,000 in syndication proceeds. This
fund was expected to generate "over $120,000 per year -- enough to reduce
the rents of 32 market units by $300 per month.'a9  Illustration VI-2 shows
the rent moderation fund as it was eventually formed, the total amounts
being considerably different.
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Illustration 1
Flow of UDAG Funds from HUD and City of Boston
to Westland Avenue Associates and Returning to City.
U.S. Dept. of
Housing and Urban Devpt.
$2,000,000 Urban Development Action Grant
to the City of Boston
*Sinking fund is
City of Boston reinvested @ 8%,
Boston Redevpt. Auth.) equals $2 million
Closing Costs: Invested Funds: $1,775,000
$225,000 direct @ 13 % annual int., yields
to W.A.A. $18,978/mo. interest to
Westland Avenue Associates.
Westland Avenue
Associates
r$3,228/mo. $15,177/mo. Mortgage $573/mo.
to Rent Mod payment writedown epay en
Program Boston*
(17 % of total (80 % of total interest) (3 % of total
interest) interest)
Based on "Westland Avenue Housing Rehabilitation Project", Bubriski, et. al,
and "Sources of Subsidy and Beneficiaries", FCDC files.
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Illustration 2.
Sources of Rent Moderation Fund
Yields approx. $90,720 annually or $7,560/mo.
at an average 12.5 % interest.
C Spread over 40 units to reduce
rents by average of $190/mo.
*Approximate amount. May be larger due to further construction
delays.
Source: "Sources of Subsidy and Beneficiaries", FCDC files.
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Project Changes and the Beginning of Conflict
After submitting the UDAG application, the partners had to rapidly
secure the financing and subsidy commitments before June of 1980, when
the UDAG was scheduled for release. Mortgage insurance and Section 8 ap-
plications would have to be completed, a tax agreement reached with the
City, and construction financing secured. During this period, the project
design went through several changes, as disd the Westland Avenue Associates
partnership. The number of units was changed several times and eventually
reduced to 101, (later reduced further to 97). The original architects,
Skidmore, Owings and Merril, were never able to achieve the twelve large
units in their designs. Construction cost estimates also rose during
this period and as a consequence the share of UDAG funds available for
rent moderation was reduced. In early May, HUD informed the partnership
that there were no Section 8 funds available for their project from the
NOFA pool which Keefe had applied for. Other sources of Section 8 funds
did exist, but for nearly two months it was uncertain whether the project
would have any low income units.
With each of these changes, FCDC became increasingly concerned
with achieving its goals for the project. Moderate rent levels appeared
unattainable under the present financing scheme, and without Section 8
subsidies there would be no low income units. FCDC wanted more assurances
on rent moderation levels and greater control over the UDAG funds which
supply the moderation pool, and told Keefe that it would not provide more
public endorsements unitl the rent moderation and Section 8 issues were
resolved. 20
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In late may, the Managing General Partner of Westland Avenue
Associates, Mario Nicosia, pulled out of the project. He had become
unsure of the financial benefits of the project, and was particularly
uncomfortable with the participation by FCDC, and their desire for control
over tenant selection and management.21 Macomber and Byron Gilcrest of
Macomber Development Associates quickly became the new managing general
partners. Macomber agreed to be the managing gereral -- and the general
contractor -- but under several conditions: that HKS become a general
partner as well, sharing liability with Macomber Development; that
Boston Architectural Team (BAT) become the project architects, since
they had more residential renovation experience than Skidmore, Owings
and Merril, and had worked with Macomber before; that no cash be required
from Macomber for the project; and that the solar building be excluded
from the project because of the potential for high cost overruns.
As part of the partnership reshuffling, Macomber Development was
to receive 51 percent of syndication proceeds. HKS would receive 39 per-
cent of the proceeds, with 10 percent or one-quarter of their proceeds
going toward the fund, and FCDC's share was doubled to 10 percent, half
of which would go into the rent moderation fund. As a result, the
total percentage of net syndication going toward rent moderation was
reduced from 20 to 15 percent, since Macomber Development was not to
contribute any proceeds to the fund. Both Macomber and HKS also
insisted in FCDC retaining its limited partner status, despite the
community group's desire to become a general partner. Keefe and Macomber
also felt that the project would be difficult to syndicate and the pro-
ceeds reduced if FCDC became a general partner. 22
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Fenway CDC Attempts to Increase Its Control
On one point the partners were all able to agree; the need for a
larger UDAG. Keefe soon submitted a request to increase the UDAG funds
from $1.5 million to $2.6 million, which was to increase the amount avail-
able for rent moderation, cover nearly all of the partners' cash require-
ments, and some increased construction costs. Other issues still greatly
divided the partners. Macomber and HKS wanted to drop the solar building
which they contended was responsible for $170,000 in extra costs not cov-
ered by the mortgage.23 FCDC continually defended the solar design as a
major goal and necessary for the community group's participation. Section
8 allocation was still uncertain, as was the size and use of the rent
moderation fund. In addition, FCDC felt increasingly excluded from major
decision making that was affecting the project. The general partner
changes had all been negotiated without FCDC's knowledge or involvement,
and in most cases FCDC was only informed after the decisions had been made.
As a limited partner, FCDC's participation in these decisions, such as
the change in architect, was not specifically required.
Unable to reach an acceptable solution to these problems through
negotiation with the other partners, FCDC attempted to influence HUD of-
ficials involved in the UDAG increase, and thus exert pressure on Keefe
and Macomber to better meet their demands. Thall detailed the community
group's concerns to Robert Embry, the HUD official in charge of the UDAG,
and requested that certain conditions be placed on the UDAG which ensured
an adequate rent moderation program. The letter defined what FCDC con-
sidered acceptable moderate rents (based on incomes ranging from 110 to
150 percent of Section 8 limits) and a minimum number of 45 moderated rent
units. An exerpt from Thall's letter to Embry showing these requested
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conditions is included in Appendix B. The total moderation fund needed
was estimated at $95,616 per year, or 10 percent annual interest on
nearly $1 million.
Fenway CDC also pursued another avenue to strengthen their
negotiating position. They applied for a HUD Neighborhood Self-help
Development Grant of $120,000 to increase its equity in the project,
pay legal and architectural consultants, office expenses and staff time,
and add to the rent moderation fund. FCDC believed that providing another
$40,000 toward working capital requirements of the partnership would
assure it general partnership status, and raise its partnership share. 24
Neither of these efforts came to fruition. Although an increased UDAG
was approved for $2 million, HUD officals did not include any of FCDC's
requested conditions. The Self-help Grant was not approved.
The Joint Venture Agreement
Section 8 subsidies for 30 units were eventually secured from the
Metropolitan Area Planning Councel, and two final steps remained to
complete the financing for Westland Avenue Apartments. A 121(A) tax
agreement had to be negotiated with the BRA, and a joint venture and
limited partnership agreement had to be reached between HKS, Macomber
Development and FCDC. HUD was requiring the agreements before making
tandem financing and Section 8 commitments. Vocal opposition by FCDC or
any other community organization would seriously jeopardize the 121(A)
agreement, as the BRA preferred to avoid controversy in these agreements.
As Keefe negotiated with the BRA for a favorable 121(A) agreement,
he was also negotiating with FCDC for a joint venture agreement, knowing
that it was imperative that there be no community opposition voiced at
the 121(A) hearing. As the late September initial closing approached,
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FCDC at least implicitly connected its support of the tax agreement
with the conditions of the joint venture agreement.
The negotiations continued down to the wire, and the joint
venture agreement was signed on September 22, 1980, four days before
closing. The agreement had several provisions. It established "Rent
Moderation Program Goals", and allowed changes in the program if they
are consistent with the established goals. The solar design would not
be removed from the project without FCDC's consent. FCDC is established
as a sponsor limited partner, with responsibility for up to $45,000 in
overruns of the project. Consent by FCDC is required for sale or re-
financing, and it must approve any changes in the management agreement.
All three partners can fire the management agent, and must agree on a
new management agent.
The Rent Moderation Program Goals, included as an appendix to the
joint venture agreement, has three basic provisions:
-"Up to 40 apartments in the Project will be rented at moderate
rent levels," through interest earned on investments form UDAG
funds and syndication proceeds.
-Moderate rents will be set at levels affordable at 110 to 150
percent of Section 8 income limits, similar to earlier FCDC
proposals (see Appendix B).
-Units of 3 or more bedrooms will receive preference for rent
moderation funds, with a minimum of six receiving moderate rent
levels. A minimum of ten large family and 17 two bedroom units
will have Section 8 subsidies.
By the time the joint venture agreement was reached, serious
lack of trust had developed between the general partners and Fenway CDC,
and their respective negotiators, Frank Keefe and Mat Thall. FCDC was
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still concerned that the project would contribute to gentrification
pressures in the neighborhood, and unsure as to whether the rent moderation
program would be carried out in an acceptable way. The rent moderation
program had been reduced from the originally proposed $1.2 million to an
ambiguous amount around $500,000. From FCDC's perspective, the general
partners were continually covering project cost increases due to poor
initial estimates by drawing from the rent fund and sacrificing the moderate
rent goals of the project. Frank Keefe felt that FCDC had continually
increased its demands and had been unwilling to compromise as the project
evelved and the economics of the costs and revenues changed.
The final project design was for 97 units, at a total development
cost of $6.9 million (including BSPRA). Syndication proceeds were to be
distributed as follows:
$1,800,000 Gross Syndication Proceeds
400,000 Syndication/Brokerage fees to FBTG
1,400,000 Net Syndication to Partners
714,000 (51%) Macomber/Gilcrest
546,000 (39%) Harrington, Keefe, and Shork
140,000 (10%) Fenway CDC
(210,000) (15%) Contributed to Rent Moderation Fund
from HKS, and FCDC.
406,000 Net to Harrington, Keefe, and Shork
(546,000 - 140,000)
70,000 Net to Fenway CDC
(140,000 - 70,000)
Construction Overruns and Subsidy Changes
It soon became apparent that the project would experience
considerable construction cost overruns, (estimated in February, 1981
at nearly $500,000), and the general partners were anticipating "cash
calls", where they must contribute cash to cover construction costs not
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paid out of the construction loan. The first building would be rented
up in late May, and the general partners and the management agent began
to solidify the rent levels and marketing strategy.
In January the general partners presented an altered proposal for
the allocation of Section 8 units and the use of rent moderation funds.
Keefe and Byron Gilcrest (of Macomber Development) felt that major
problems existed in the previous plan because many smaller apartments
in the back of the buildings were designated as market rate units, and
their marketability was in doubt.
Their proposal was to shift Section 8 subsidies onto the smaller,
less marketable units so that the larger units could obtain premium rents,
above those allowed under Section 8 guidelines, of over $900 per month for
3-bedroom units. Under this plan, only four large family units would
receive Section 8 subsidy. FCDC objected to the plan and formulated an
alternative plan that dealt with the marketing issues but also retained
the group's major goals. In addition to the desire to keep Section 8
subsidies for large units, FCDC objected to raising market tents on
moderation program became much less effective. The Fenway CDC negotiators
proposed that ten 3- and 4- bedroom units receive Section 8 subsidies,
that market rents remain at similar levels as originally proposed, and
that moderate rent levels also remain within the guidelines set in the
Rent Moderation Program Goals.
The partners also disagreed on the amount of rent moderation
funds available. The major source of rent moderation funds --UDAG funds
remaining after paying debt service -- was controlled by the general partners,
and after construction cost overruns the amount available for rent moderation
became in doubt. Keefe and Gilcrest estimated annual rent moderation funds
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at $48,830. FCDC, by retaining a larger fund from the UDAG at a higher
interest rate, estimated the rent moderation fund at more than $73,000.25
The general partners and FCDC were in total disagreement on how
to deal with these issues and the tensions and mistrust between them
increased. The community group's only leverage at this point was with the
BRA and HUD officials. The BRA controlled the UDAG funds in dispute and
must approve any changes in their use, including the rent moderation
program. FCDC wanted the BRA to place requirements on the rent moder-
ation program that met the community group's criteria on the amount and
distribution of the funds. The BRA's response--to FCDC's disappointment--
was to not become involved.
HUD had to approve the Section 8 unit changes and the developer's
request for a 5% increase in the subsidy amount, and the HUD area office
was requiring the signature of both FCDC, and, the general partners to
the new allocation plan, but refused to take any mediating role between
the openly feuding partners. As rent-up for the first building approached,
the partners grew no closer to agreement, and the management agent intended
on renting according to the general partner's plan.
In an effort to exert pressure on the general partners, Fenway
CDC decided to take the dispute into the public realm. Letters were sent
to Senators Kennedy and Tsongas, explaining the conflicts and what FCDC
considered misuse of public funds. In May, an article appeared in the
Fenway News with the caption "As Construction Nears Completion, Developers
Hike Rents On Westland Avenue." The article read, in part:
"FCDC has charged that the developers have broken repeated
promises to the Fenway community, commitments about affordable
rents and family housing that were made in writing in the
various applications for subs-dies for the project. The de-
velopers state that they regret that there will not be as
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much affordable housing as they were committed to, but
they must be conservative about rents ag subsidies
during the first year of the project."
Tensions between the partners increased as Frank Keefe regarded
these actions to be public attacks on his reputation. The FCDC members,
knowing that both Keefe and Macomber were very sensitive to their public
reputation were counting on the negative publicity to pressure them to
compromise.27
With additional pressure from HUD to keep large units on Section 8
subsidies, a compromise was finally reached on the allocation of low and
moderate rents. Seven large family units would remain on Section 8 sub-
sidies, and four on rent moderation. The amount of rent moderation funds
was agreed to, yielding over $73,000 annually to be spread over 40 units. 28
Ironically, construction delays resulted in more UDAG interest accrueing
to the rent moderation fund than expected, and the annual amount will be
over $90,000 with a principle of approximately $730,000.29
After construction was completed in February, 1982, the project
had accumulated over $600,000 in cost overruns.30 Based on the income
from higher market tents, the general partners applied for a mortgage
increase from HUD for $412,000, to a total of $6,730,000.31 $100,000 of
the overruns had already been covered through UDAG interest during con-
struction. Total project costs had risen to nearly $7.5 million.
After the general partners announced their intention to apply for
the mortgage increase, FCDC considered attempting to block the increase
as a way of extracting guarantees against future rent increases. However,
FCDC members decided atainst this tactic, feeling that the tension and
and animosity, which had abated, should not be revived and that there
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would be little benefit to the subsidy programs from blocking the mortgage
increase. FCDC agreed not to intervene in the application, but instead,
FCDC members decided to put their efforts into a more tested method of-
keeping rents down in the Fenway -- organizing the tenants of Westland
Avenue Apartments.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE WESTLAND AVENUE JOINT VENTURE
The Fenway Community Development Corporation's many goals were
met to varying degrees. Probably the biggest success was in the solar
building design, which was retained and finally built, and includes some
subsidized units. It is now operating successfully as a mixed-income,
solar heated building. FCDC did have to compromise on some of its other
major housing goals. The "bottom line" of twelve subsidized large family
units was eventually reduced to ten, and the effects of the rent moder-
ation program have fallen short of its initial expectations. Moderated
rent levels will be rising over time and not be affordable to moderate
income people by FCDC's standards. This is not to say that the community
developer did not have a significatn impact, since without FCDC's involve-
ment the project would have been quite different. The solar building
would not have been built. It is possible that, after losing the initial
Section 8 allocations, Keefe would not have pursued further Section 8
subsidies and the project would be without low income units. Furthermore,
without FCDC's persistence the rent moderation program would have been
greatly reduced or eliminated, with the UDAG funds instead providing
further general construction subsidy. Keefe himself has said that the
community group's involvement caused the developers to "challenge some
assumptions", and that "a better project resulted." 32Still, many FCDC
members feel that renovating the Westland Avenue buildings will have
a secondary displacement effect that will be detrimental to the neighbor-
hood and the organization's goals. This internal conflict was perhaps
unavaoidable by virtue of FCDC's participation in a large, visible rehab-
ilitation project in an area with increasing market pressures, but the
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group would have felt more -successful had FCDC gained more control over
the project and achieved more of its housing objectives.
FCDC also achieved moderate success on its organizational object-
ives. As a result of the Westland Avenue project, it has become a well
known community organization with .an active and revitalized membership
and board of directors. FCDC has also forged a stronger, more positive
relationship with state agencies and HUD, and recently received a small
stat grant for operating and staff expenses.. In addition, due to its
strong stance on housing issues, FCDC is still viewed as promoting
community iterests above its own development activities and has maintainedA
its credibility as a community representative on housing issues in the
neighborhood. FCDC's net syndication proceeds, while only a small per-
centage of the total, have sustained the organization for more than a
year.
Still, there have been some disappointments in FCDC's role in
the partnership. The community organization did not achieve general
partner status, as it had originally hoped, and did not have direct
control over major decisions. A more major decision making role would
have increased FCDC's visibility in the project and improved its repu-
tation as a developer. The partnership is also a failure, for both the
community and private developers, in that their working relationship
completely dissolved due to conflicts over design and subsidy issues.
For the community organization, this level of conflict may have a detri-
mental effect in the long run. FCDC may now have a bad reputation with
potential development partners as a result of the Westland Avenue conflicts,
which will make future joint venture developments very difficutl for the
community organization.
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Could the conflicts between the partners have been avoided, given
the unusual financing of the project? Why was FCDC unable to take a more
major position in the partnership, and what could have changed that posi-
tion? Finally, what does the Westland Avenue partnership suggest for
similar joint ventures in the future that may be facing similar financial
circumstances, and how similar or different is Wbstland Avenue from the
joint ventures described earlier in Chapters IV and V ?
Project Financing and the Partnership's Conflicts
The Westland Avenue partnership had conflicts common to other
joint ventures, such as design issues, distribution of proceeds, and
control over management and refinancing, but the complicated and unusual
financing -- including a market rent component and the rent moderation
fund -- created special problems between FCDC and its for-profit partners.
The most important difference between Westland Avenue Apartments
and other projects studied is that Westland Avenue is highly dependent on
a market-rate housing component as well as the various subsidy programs.
The financing and subsidy package for the project is an attempt to address
the problems of housing finance by using multiple external subsidies, such
as low interest financing and Section 8 subsidies, and adding an "internal
subsidy" to make the project feasible. "Internal subsidy" here refers to
the use of high market rents on some units, and a portion of syndication
proceeds to lower the rents on other units. Illustrations 3 and 4
demonstrate the internal subsidy concept and as it is applied to Westland
Avenue's financing. The internal subsidy is actually only a small part of
the total subsidies for the project. Without the general subsidy, rents
averaging approximately $1,150 per month per unit would be needed to
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Illustration 3, Pure Internal Rent Subsidy
(A)
True Economic
Rent
(B)
(C)
S.-
0
High Market Lowered Rents Average Rents
Rents
= internal subsidy resulting from syndication proceeds
In this case, the true economic rent (rent/unit necessary to support the
project) is achieved through rent skewing, where rents above economic rent
allow lower rents on other units. Use of syndication proceeds can be used
to further reduce rents. This example is only possible if market rents can
be higher than economic rents. In the above case, High Market Rents are at
(A) dollars/unit, and the surplus is used to reduce Lowered Rents to (B).
Syndicator proceeds further reduce rents in Lowered Rent units to (C). The
average revenue is at True Economic Rent.
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Illustration 4, Westland Avenue External and Internal Subsidy Mechanisms
True Economic 1150
Rent
General Subsidy
(550/unit month
average)
680
Subsidized Rent 600
560
370
200(varies)
High Market
Rents
(26 units)
Moderated
Rents
(40 units)
Low Income
Rents
(30 units)
Average
Rents
(96 units)
total
= Section 8 rent supplements for low income units.
= Rent moderation program subsidy, a
*,income and syndication proceeds.
Rent levels represent hypothetical
on varying unit sizes.
combination of UDAG
average unit based
In this case, the general subsidy reduces the average rent necessary for project
feasibility. For Westland Avenue Apartments, A UDAG "writedown", GNMA financing
and 121(A) agreement reduced the necessary averag3e rent by approximately $550/month
per unit. The rent moderation program (internal and external subsidies) further
reduced moderate rents by $190/month. Other units were deeply subsidized
through Section 8 allowances.
4-)
C
0
S-
0
...Z .
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support renovation and operating costs. Assuming that the present market
rents of $500 to $925 per month are the highest obtainable in the Fenway,
the project would clearly not be feasible without the GNMA financing,
UDAG writedown, and local tax agreement.
The internal subsidies and rent-moderation program are actually
minor in comparison to these outside subsidies, reducing less than half
of the units' rent by an average of $190 per month, of which only $50 per
month results form syndication proceeds. Despite the three-tiered rent
structure, there is no formal rent skewing mechanism for the project.
The high market rents account for approximately $1,700 per month in
additional revenue above the Section 8 fair-market rents ($750 per month
for a 4-bedroom unit, as opposed to $925).33 FCDC advocated formally
using some of this income to lower moderate rents, but instead it was
used to obtain the mortgage increase. Without the additional market income,
it is possible that additional UDAG interest would have gone toward debt
service rather than rent moderation, but this is not certain. FCDC hopes
that a rent skewing mechanism can eventually be set up to reduce the
inflation of moderated rents. Under the current arrangement, rents on
moderated units will rise by 8 percent annually along with Section 8
unit rents.
The UDAG funds, rent moderation program, and "internal subsidy"
allowed a more flexible allocation of subsidies than normally exists for
sponsors of Section 8 housing, and the final distribution of those funds
had a direct effect on both the private developer's profits from the project
and the community developer's objectives. FCDC quickly found itself
taking a strong tenant advocacy position as the internal subsidy and rent
level issues added a futher layer of conflict where the community and
A
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private developer's had very opposing interests. The UDAG funds, for
example, could be allocated toward either construction subsidy or the
rent moderation program, and it was in the general partner's interest
to allocate the funds toward construction costs, and cost overruns in
particular. FCDC, however, wanted the funds directed toward the rent
moderation program and suggested that the other prtners use their syndi-
cation proceeds to cover cost overruns. FCDC argued that the developers
should absorb more of the costs themselves, rather than raising market
rents or reducing moderation funds.
As the project economics changed and the subsidy and rent programs
became more specific, the private developer's main concern was keeping
the project financially stable and at least reasonably profitable, and
allocated funds and subsidies accordingly. Frank Keefe was very hesitant
to make definite commitments regarding ultimate rent levels or subsidy
distributions, knowing that the costs were not firm, and regarded any
such commitments as secondary to basic financial priorities. FCDC, on
the other hand, had a "bottom line" on its goals for the project, which
include the creation of a substantial number of large family units at
least twelve affordable to low income families, approximately half of
the units at what the group considered truely moderate rent levels, ie.
affordable to moderate income people, and completing the solar building
as part of the project. Without these goals, none of which were financial,
FCDC would not support the project.
These conflcits came to a head during construction, when the
general partners proposed removing Section 8 subsidies from large family
units, and using the shrinking rent moderation fund to provide shallow
subsidy for 40 units. Shifting Section 8 subsidies form large units to
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smaller units was advantageous to the private developers because of the
higher market rents they felt the larger units could draw. For mixed-income
projects, HUD sets Section 8 rent levels at 100 percent of "fair market
rents" based on local averages, which in this case were set at $718 per
month for a 3-bdroom unit and $750 per month for a 4-bedroom unit. 34
Keefe and the managing agent felt that several of the large units were
the most marketable in the project, because of their size and location,
and could be rented at over $900 per month for both 3- and 4-bedroom units.
The increased revenues would allow the partners to apply for a mortgage
increase to cover project cost overruns, leaving a greater share of synd-
ication proceeds for the general partners. To the community organization,
removing the large family Section 8 units flew in the face of its most
important goal -- providing low income family housing in the Fenway.
Adding to this dispute, the partners also had conflicting interests in
how the rent moderation funds should be applied. FCDC preferred to target
the funds toward fewer units, reducing the tenants share of the rent to
a level affordable to people with incomes just above Section 8 limits.
Income eligibility criteria would then be applied in tenant selection, so
that the moderated units were rented to moderate income people. The
private developers proposed shallower subsidies for more units, essentially
making them more marketable and reducing vacancy rates, with more
flexible income eligibility criteria.
Conflicts such as these do not exist in joint ventures where
subsidy levels are more completely prescribed. Marcus Garvey Gardens, for
example, was 100 percent Section 9 subsidized with MHFA financing.
A portion of Macomber's syndication proceeds was used to cover construction
costs, but this was understood beforehand. The level of subsidy was not
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in dispute.
In the Brightwood joint venture, which also included a market-
rate componenet with a UDAG writedown, the rent levels were not in dispute.
Brightwood Development Corporation was not as concerned about the dis-
placement effects of the market rate units and was not trying to create
additional subsidized units through an internal subsidy. Thus, both the
private and community developer had the same basic objectives for the
market-rate housing -- a financially stable and well run project. Even
in 808 Memorial Drive, where Riverside/Cambridgport Community Corporation
changed the project from all luxury rentals to a mixed income project,
disputes between the community and private developers did not focus on
the details of the subsidy mechanism. After deciding to use MHFA financ-
ing, a fairly standard income and subsidy mix was applied which, at that
time, reduced the market risks and allowed substantial profits to the
developer from syndication. Instead, the conflicts between RCCC and
Nemetz were focused on design issues.
Is the heightened level of conflict in the Westland Avenue joint
venture inherent in the internal subsidy and market rent issues, and can
future joint vnetures with similar financing mechanisms expect these
conflicts? Certainly some of the conflicts can be attributed to FCDC's
strong tenant advocacy stance which some community developers might not
be willing to take. FCDC is linked to Fenway tenant organizations through
its board members, and Fenway neighborhood organizations (and activists)
have a history of conflict-oriented negotiations as a result of urban
renewal, institutional expansion and anti-arson struggles. It is also
important that both principle negotiators were relatively inexperienced
in business negotiations of this- type. Westland Avenue Apartments was
Frank Keefe's first major real estate development, and he essentially
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acted as the project manager. Similarly, Mat Thall was a Planner for
the Cambridge Housing Authority, but had no private development experience
of this scale. These factors notwithstanding, joint venture projects
which include internal subsidies and market risks will have more conflict-
ing interest between the community and private partners than previous
projects completely supported by esternal subsidies. It follows that
community developers in joint ventures may be increasingly forced into
a tenant advocacy role, which suggests that the polarization that occurred
in Westland Avenue Associates could easily be repeated.
The greater amount of uncertainty associated with such innovative
financing also presents problems likely to result in conflicts. Since
the development process is not as predictable as under more tested Section
8 financing, it is more difficult to anticipate costs and rent levels, unit
mix, and final design early in the process, and the partners must be
continually working toward resolving these issues as the project's financ-
ing takes shape. Because of the financial undertainties, private develop-
ers will be more reluctant to make commitments of the type that FCDC sought,
ie. a minimum nmber of subsidized family units, rent levels, and design
criteria (such as the solar building). The community developer, on the
other hand, is concerned about preserving its own housing gains and will
try to set minimum goals for the project, while still negotiating for
other gains as financing proceeds. Initial agreements are thus difficult
to reach and conflicts result from the changing project finances.
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The Initial Agreement and FCDC's Role in the Partnership
The initial agreement signed by the partners, and their concensus
of intent to produce a mixed income project with a substantial proportion
of moderate rent units was of no use in resolving the conflicts around the
subsidy programs and the solar building. The premises of the agreement
quickly changed and, while the partners had deleqated responsibilities to
some extent, they had not delegated control over specific aspects-of the
project. The community developer, as a weaker partner in the joint venture,
found itself with no formal control over any aspect of the project as the
conflicts increased.
The aggreement was to participate in a project, then 107 units at
a cost of roughly $6 million with financing and rents still uncertain.
The partners had also agreed to complementary responsibilities. Nicosia,
(and later Macomber) provided financial backing, HKS secured the subsidies
and financing, and FCDC provided community support. What the agreement did not
do was specify each partne's authority should the partners disagree.
This meant that each partner's control resulted from their relative importance
to the project, and their control over daily development activities.
Consequently, FCDC had the most ambiguous control, with no control over
daily activities, and the rather uncertain importance of community support.
The unit mix changed, the financing and rent structure changed,
and FCDC no longer supported the project. When FCDC threatened to withdraw
support, as its only source of leverage, the other partners regarded this
as breaking an agreement to support the project. From FCDC's perspective,
the other partners had broken the agreement by changing the project without
including FCDC in the decision process, and disregarding the objectives of
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the project as FCDC understood them.
This problem for FCDC is in some ways similar to the Brightwood
joint venture, where the initial agreement between the community and
private developers was very specific regarding financial contributions,
development responsibilities and financial benefits, but very ambiguous
around the issue of control , particularly after initial closing.
Brightwood Development Corporation was in a much stronger position than
FCDC regarding its ability to stop the project, and negotiated control over
several key issues in the development and management. Still, as discus-
sed earlier in Chapter V, BDC's ultimate control and financial benefits
were reduced because of the ambiguous agreement with MB Group.
How might control have been less ambiguously delegated early, in
the Westland Avenue partnership, particularly when developers are unwil-
ling to make commitments before financing is certain? A more detailed
agreement was clearly needed before the partnership pursued financing
commitments and finalized architectural work. The joint venture agree-
ment, as unsatisfactory as it was in specifying FCDC's decision making
power, was only signed days before initial closing. Had an earlier
agreement delegated specific rights and controls to FCDC, its decision-
making authority might have been increased. FCDC might have sought control
over the rent moderation program, for example, as its role in management,
an extremely important goal for the community developer and a major
conflict in the partnership. In exchange, FCDC would have taken greater
liability for operating deficits on moderated units.
There are some clear disadvantages to this approach as well, since
FCDC would not want to lose control over other aspects of the develop-
ment before financing and design issues had been resolved. Gaining
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specific controls may also have required FCDC to have more demonstrated
political influence than it actually had. In this case, ambiguity might
have worked to the community developer's advantage.
The Solar Building
Another conflict between the partners running throughout the
development period was the solar building. On several occasions the
private developers wanted to drop the solar design, or the whole building
from the project but FCDC insisted on its inclusion in the final plan.
This conflict, while perhaps not as unique to Westland Avenue, is very
indicative of the difficulty that undercapitalized community developers
have in joint ventures, and their attempts to leverage multiple goals
out of housing developments.
For FCDC, the solar building served several purposes. It was
designed to demonstrate the feasibility of passive solar heating in the
city, and several FCDC members were ardent solar enthusiasts, but also
to demonstrate that solar design is feasible in a building that includes
families and low and moderate income people. Thus, it was important that
the solar design not only be retained, but also include large family and
subsidized units. The solar building was also FCDC's major contribution
to the project, both in terms of equity through the $50,000 grant, and
in physical design. The solar design symbolized FCDC's involvement in the
partnership and in the neighborhood. It is perhaps this symbolic value
as much as the other benefits of the solar building that prompted FCDC
to threaten withdrawal from the partnership when the architects announced
an alternate, non-solar design for the building. Thall claimed that FCDC
would "sink the project" if the solar design was not kept.
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Why were the private developers so opposed to the solar design?
At first, Keefe and Nicosia were concerned about extra costs due to the
design which could not be supported by the mortgage, but the alternate
design indicated a difference of only $70,000, most of which would be
covered by the solar grant. After Macomber Development became the managing
general partner, however, and recosted the solar building, they again
became concerned that the design would have cost overruns in the vicinity
of $170,000. The additional problem was the relatively high acquisition
price for the building, ($200,000 for the solar and one other building)
and Keefe wanted to drop the two buildings from the project completely.
Interestingly, the solar building also illustrates a classic
disadvantage of undercapitalized community organizations as developers.
FCDC had a purchase option on 65/67 and 83 Westland Avenue for $125,000
(65/67 had the solar design) and was negotiating with the owner for a
renewed option at a lower price.35 The BRA had appraised the buildings
at $75,000, and FCDC "did not want arsonists to profit from its activities.',36
FCDC and several other Fenway organizations had a Community Development
Block Grant sufficient to purchase the building, but other financing was
uncertain and the grant would go farther at a lower purchase price. When
Nicosia and HKS approached the owner for an option after FCDC's had
expired, the purchase price had risen to $200,000. Fenway CDC thus lost
its site control over its project becuase of tis limited ability to
compete with a well capitalized developer, and the slower decision making
process involved in public financing of community development organiza-
tions. Early in the partnership, FCDC offered to purchase the solar
building shells for $125,000, using its Block Grant funds. The private
developers declined the offer, prefering to retain control over the
buildings despite the higher costs.
114
The Source of FCDC's Negotiating Strength
The factors which influence a community developer's negotiating
strength, discussed in Chapter V, are very applicable to FCDC in West-
land Avenue Associates. Similar to 808 Memorial Drive, FCDC acted as a
community support partner and contributed very few financial or other
development resources to the partnership. The $50,000 solar grant contrib-
uted by FCDC, which Thall refers to as equity, is largely negated by the
extra costs encurred by the solar design, and the fact that the UDAG
covered most of the cash requirements of the general partners. Instead
of financial resources, FCDC attempted to use its politica 1 resources
to affect the partnership, and its negotiating strength relied almost
exlusively on its ability, real or perceived, to influence public officials
who control subsidy allocation and approvals. This results from FCDC's
delegated role in the partnership of "delivering the community" and its
unspecified decision making role, as discussed earlier.
Frank Keefe and Mat Thall disagree as to whether Fenway CDC or
other community groups could have (or would have) stopped the Westland
Avenue project. Keefe claims that the project met the objectives of
FenPac, then the strongest community group in the Fenway, and would have
been supported by FenPac and other community groups even if FCDC were
not included as a partner. Thall points out that several Fenway organiz-
ations are represented on the FCDC board of directors, and that the
chairperson of FenPac was an FCDC member and part of the Westland Avenue
negotiating team. Without FCDC's support, claims Thall, the project
"would have faced a severely divided community at best," and possibly
concerted opposition.
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It is doubtful that FCDC could have completely halted the project
in the sense that RCCC had "veto power" over 808 Memorial Drive. Fenway
community groups are not strongly supported by the BRA, whereas RCCC
enjoyed the support of the Cambridge Planning Board and the Community
Development Department. It is also apparent that Frank -Keefe's experience
in Massachusetts government and his connections to both local and HUD
officials were instrumental in obtaining subsidies and approvals for the
project. If FCDC were to oppose the Westland Avenue project, it would
have been working against Keefe's (and Macomber's) reputation and support
in various levels of government.
Despite its lack of political strength and financial assets, FCDC
was able to substantially influence the partnership, largely through
local and federal officials. Because of the many subsidies and approvals
required, public officials have an important and active role in the project.
The BRA, for example, placed several conditions on the UDAG loan to
Westland Avenue Associates, including some control over the rent moder-
ation program and annual approval of rent levels, even though these controls
have not met FCDC's standards. 37  FCDC relied on some degree of support from
the BRA when the joint venture agreement was negotiated simultaneously
with the local property tax agreement. FCDC's only bargaining tool at
that point was its alleged ability to jeopardize the 121(A) agreement if
the community chose to object at the public hearing. Similarly, FCDC
convinced Marvin Siflinger of HUD to support its position on retaining
large family Section 8 units. Without Siflinger's support on this issue,
the subsidies would have been shifted to smaller units.
Support by these public agencies for FCDC itself was actually
not very strong at all. In fact, much of the community organizing activity
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had been directed against the City, the Mayor, and the BRA, and Fenway
organizations were seen as antagonists to the existing administration.
The BRA distrusted FCDC, which had actively opposed the Copley Place
project, and was concerned that the orgnaization would oppose the BRA's
decisions regarding the UDAG and 121(A) agreements for Westland Avenue.
The source of FCDC's limited support from these agencies, then, was its
ability to create a controversy around the project, and that both the
BRA and HUD preferred to avoid an image of neighborhood opposition to
publicly funded projects. But how far did this antagonist-based support
go? FCDC was not able to persuade the BRA or HUD to place more stringent
control on the rent moderation fund or intervene in the negotiations.
From FCDC's perspective, the BRA is still taking too passive a role in
the development by approving a second year rent moderation program that
has further rent hikes on moderated units.
It is also important that FCDC had begun development efforts on
two buildings before they were optioned by Nicosia, and obtained
preliminary commitments of support from HUD and the BRA. Westland
Avenue is thus not so easily classified as privately or community init-
iated, since the developers were in competition for the sites and the
subsidy to develop them. FCDC was able to successfully convert its
preliminary subsidy commitments into "political capital" to support
its position in the partnership.
In summary, FCDC's use of community support and the threat of
opposition as negotiating strength yielded mixed results. On several
occasions, key public officials did not indicate strong enough support
for FCDC to give it the necessary leverage in the partnership. Persist-
ence on the community group's patt, however, and the eventual use of
public forums, did result in some gains for FCDC.
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FCDC's Partnership Postion
FCDC has a special limited partnership position in Westland
Aoenue Associates, similar to RAP in Marcus Garvey Associates and the
position that RCCC once held in 808 Memorial Drive, and while in some
ways the limited partner position benefitted FCDC in its tenant advocacy
role, it also made it very difficult for the community group to exert
any influence over major partnership decisions. The two most important
features of this partnership position are that FCDC's control over the
project is limited to the provisions of the joint venture agreement
(which has proven minimal in controlling the rent moderation fund), and
there is virtually no liability for construction or operating deficits
on the CDC's part. (Although there were cost overruns in the solar
building, they were not separated from other building costs and FCDC was
never called on for cash distributions.) The lack of liability
has certain advantages for FCDC, as its syndication share is essentially
guaranteed. It also further divorces the interests of FCDC and the
general partners and to some extent allowed the community group to
adopt a strong advocacy position. Without liability for overruns and
deficits, pressuring the general partners to absorb these costs had no
impact on FCDC's syndication proceeds.
In retrospect, Frank Keefe feels that this was a major error
because it divided the partnership, and that the community partners should
share the risks as well as the benefits. 39  Mat Thall agrees. FCDC would
have preferred a general partner position, and was willing to accept
liability in exchange for greater control and a larger syndication share.
A general partnership position -- and the corresponding liability -- would
have changed FCDC's negotiating strategy. The organization would have
..-pported the mortgage increase to HUD, for example, si
it would have reduced its own losses from construction overruns. More
important, claims Thall, "the character of the conflict would not
have been as public."40
The Fenway Community Development Corporation would have benefit-
ted greatly from a general partner position in the development, primarily
because as a limited partner in the community support role, FCDC was unabh
to influence the partnership in any way other than through the threat
of withdrawing community support. While FCDC was able to extract certain
gains because of its diligence, a general partner position, similar to
that of the Brightwood Development Corporation in its joint venture, would
have afforded FCDC with more clearly delineated control over the
development.
The greates disadvantage to FCDC's limited partner was that it
was excluded from major decisions of the general partners. FCDC's role
was to respond to decisions that had already been made in private by
HKS and Nicosia, or HKS and Macomber Development. For example, FCDC was
at one point asked to approve a completed architectural plan which had
to be submitted to HUD almost immediately. With no time to complete
another more suitable plan, FCDC had to settle for promises of later
revisions. Similarly, rent-up and marketing plans were completed with
the management agent shortly before their implementation, with little
opportunity for FCDC to respond. More recently, FCDC has requested
that the BRA require FCDC's comments on annual rent moderation plans,
which the managing general partner would otherwise submit without
consulting FCDC. Had FCDC been in a general partner position and been a
more major partner in the development, it would have been more directly
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involved rather than struggling for a strong response voice.
A second advantage to a general partner position is that, as
a major partner, FCDC's reputation as a community developer would have
been greatly improved, and finally, it would expect an increased share
of syndication proceeds as a general partner, as is clear from the
experience of other community developers in joint ventures. Net
syndication proceeds to FCDC, after contributing to rent moderation and
paying expenses, will be approximately $50,000. Enough, perhaps to pay
salary and office expenses but not enough to cover pre-development costs
for another project, or contribute to the organization's net worth.
But could FCDC have been a general partner given the existing
circumstances? Probably not, and fo'r several reasons. From the private
developer's perspective, FCDC did not enter the partnership with enough
resources to warrent general partner status. Macomber and Keefe provided
the buildings, working capital, net worth and even the subsidies. FCDC
could offer only community support, and even Thall's efforts to increase
FCDC's equity contribution (through the Self-help grant) would have been
insignificatn since the UDAG convered most of the general partner's
cash requirements. Since FCDC had no net worth, sharing liability would
have been of little beneift to the partnership unless it also had a
correspondingly larger syndication share..
Furthermore, early in the development process, FCDC established
itself as having conflicting goals and interests with the general partners.
This only increased Keefe's resistance to giving the community group a
general partner position, since he felt that FCDC was already exerting too
much control in its present position. Macomber had already shown his
preference for community groups as limited partners, as in Marcus Garvey
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Associates with RAP, even when the community developer provides substan-
tial resources. Finally, as Keefe noted, a general partner position for
FCDC would have met great resistance from the project's syndicator, Boston
Financial Technology Group.
Increasing Control and Reducing Conflict With Limited Resources
To summarize the above analysis, the Westland Avenue joint venture
experienced major conflicts between the partners and in the end the
community developer found it had only an indirect involvement in decisions,
largely through confrontational tactics. This has to be considered with
the relatively few financial resources brought into the project by the
communjty group, but from FCDC's perspective, the Westland Avenue partner-
ship would have been more successful if it had more direct involvement in
major decisions. This would have furthered both its housing objectives
and organizational goals. FCDC members would also have prefered a better
relationship with their prtners, with fewer conflicts and the detrimental
results.
FCDC's experience, and evidence from other joint ventures suggests
that a major partner role is only possible when the community developer
has a very strong initiating role and brings substantial financial resources
into the project, as in the Brightwood and IBA joint ventures. This
suggests that FCDC would have needed options on most of the Westland
Avenue buildings, at least preliminary subsidy commitments, and substantial
assets to cover up-front costs if it were to have been a general partner
and exerted more control over the project. At the time, this would have .
been impossible for FCDC because of its limited financial assets, organi-
zational history, and minimal support from the city administration. FCDC
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might have greatly increased its partnership position if it had retained
its purchase options on two of the Westland Avenue buildings, but
unfortunately it could not.
FCDC's position without these purchase options or other major
financial contribution to the partnership, however, is not atypical
of a small community group without a development track record. Thus,
the critical question is how FCDC, or any other similar community
developer could have strengthened its position without the purchase options
or other major resources? What other factors could have been affected
and what negotiating strategy adopted to increase FCDC's role in the
partnership and also reduce the conflicts? This analysis addressed
these questions in several ways, perhpas the most important being the
need to establish a firm, ongoing decision role for the community group
as the development proceeds. As with earlier joint ventures, the sooner
a community developer can contribute or control development resources
the better. Support from public agencies, such as HUD and the BRA is
also critical, and community groups must work toward increasing the
importance of community support in the eyes of public officials. These
factors may not significantly reduce the conflicts between the partners,
however, since the partners would still have fundamental disagreements
on major issues such as the use of UDAG funds and the market rent levels.
With these issues greatly affecting each partner's objectives for the
project, the.private developer's financial criteria and FCDC's housing
goals, it is doubtful that the conflicts could have been avoided.
Westland Avenue Associates presents some differences from earlier
joint ventures because of its unusual financing structure, and the
concluding chapter explores the implications of such innovative financing
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on future joint ventures and community development strategies. Some
of the recommendations correspond to the joint venture strategy outlined
at the end of Chapter V, such as narrowing the community group's goals,
and establishing early control over resources, but a further attempt
is made to suggest how community developers can increase their negotiat-
ing strength in joint ventures without the benefits of deep development
subsidies.
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CHAPTER VII
JOINT VENTURE STRATEGIES IN AN ERA OF SCARCE SUBSIDIES
Changes for Community Hdusing Developers and Joint Venture Developments
Community housing development is entering an era of scarce sub-
sidies, temporarily at least, as major federal programs are reduced or
eliminated. With the end of the Section 8 rental program, the United
States is without a major federal subsidized housing production program.
Community developers have relied very heavily on federal subsidies for
their developments, and likewise community private joint ventures. Low
interest financing was provided first through the Section 236 program, and
later through programs such as the GNMA "tandem" used in the Brightwood
and Westland Avenue projects. The "tandem" program no longer exists.
Even financing by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency has been severely
curtailed, since the agency can only finance projects with at least 25
percent of the units at rents affordable to low-income residents. 1
Without operating subsidies, such as Section 8, this is a difficult
requirement for developers to meet. Community housing development is
thus in a period of turmoil and transition,-where developers, including
community groups and for-profit developers, are seeking new ways of
packaging innovative financing and shallow subsidies to produce modest
community housing goals. An example is the pending Massachusetts legi-
slation that would allow MHFA to finance condominium developments, with
a portion of the units purchased as state public housing. 2
In addition to the curtailments of these subsidies, community
developers face other losses in their development resources that severely
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hinder their housing and community development activities. Urban
renewal parcels were an important resource for community developers in
the early 1970's, as IBA's use of Parcel 19 illustrates. Gaining
designated developer status was one way for community developers to
overcome their competitive disadvantage, without capital resources, in
gaining site control over prime development parcels. For the most part,
this resource is no longer available. The few urban land parcels that
are in public control -- surplus schools and abandoned buildings, for
example -- often have a very competitive disposition process, particularly
if the parcel is financially desirable. In many cases, local admini-
strations are looking to these buildings as a vehicle for private
investment rather than community housing objectives.
Community developers also rely heavily on federal and state
grants for their own operating funds, and to pay pre-development and
planning costs. These funds are also being reduced or spread more thinly
as the cost of operating and development planning rises and the need
for these funds increases. The Community Enterprise Economic Development
program (or CEED), for example, uses state and federal money to fund core
staff for CDC's, usually on specific projects or programs. State funding
has increased over the last two years, but not enough to compensate for
the cuts in federal funding to the program.
The sum of these changes for community developers is that, while
the financing of community development is changing, community developers
are facing financial and tther resource constraints that are even greater
than in the past, making their role in future development even more dif-
ficult and uncertain. Joint ventures between private and community develop-
ers will also be affected by these changes, primarily because of the
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changing finance structure and the implications of those changes on the
community-private relationship, but also because of the fewer development
resources available to community organizations.
Westland avenue is generally considered an innovative project
in terms of financing and rent structure. As housing and subsidies are
reduced and more thinly spread, projects that are only partially dependent
on external subsidies and include a strong market-rate component will
become more common. Syndication proceeds will be used to make marginally
feasible projects more secure. Internal subsidies may be used to increase
the community housing gains from shallow subsidies only covering a few
units. If this is true, and fully subsidiezed projects are no longer
possible, then community developers will fin4themselves more frequently
involved in market housing developments in an attempt to extract or
preserve relatively modest housing goals from them. This is essentially
the role of Fenway Community Development Corporation in Westland Avenue
Associates. Furthermore, FCDC's position of contributing relatively
few financial resources to the partnership may also reflect a more
frequent position of community developers in joint ventures in the future.
Lessons From Westland Avenue and Future Joint Venture Stra
The Westland Avenue joint venture can be distinguished from earlier
partnerships by the importance of conflicts around financing, by the
increasing role of public officials and community support, and by the
different community development objectives in the face of scarce subsidies.
Many of the conclusions from Westland Avenue relate directly to
the unusual financing structure and to the community developer's role in
the partnership as a result of that financing. Most important is the
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Community-Private Developer Conflicts
During Resource Scarcity
Community Developer
* Fewer subsidies leads to greater
competition for those that exist.
The community developer wants con-
trol over remaining subsidies to
ensure maximum community benefits
will result, but is concerned about
participating in a largely private
devel opment.
* To justify its participation,
community developer is seeking early
commitments on housing goals such as
rent levels or number of subsidized
units.
* Uncertain financing results in
unpredictable development process
necessitating project changes.
Community developer wants changes
to be based primarily on preserving
community housing goals.
* To increase its negotiating
strength, community developer wants
increased participation by govern-
ment agencies and active inter-,
v'ention on behalf.of the community
group's position within the partner-
ship.
* Community developer is hoping to
enhance its development reputation
through a strong decision role and
visible impact on project.
Private Developer
S Private developer wants remaining
subsidies to make private investment
more feasible, but is concerned
about community and government
involvement in the project creating
excessive requirements.
* Private developer is unwilling
to make such commitments because
of the uncertain financial position,
insufficient subsidies, and desire
to retain development options.
* Private developer wants project
changes to be based primarily
on financial criteria to ensure
viability of private investment
and return on that investment.
* Private developer prefers passive
government role, similar to earlier
subsidized projects, to reduce inter-
ference and hasten development.
* Private developer needs visible
community support, but wants a
minimal decision role for the
community partner.
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fact that the need for stretching public subsidies through internal
subsidy mechanisms, the creative use of syndication, and a three-tier
rent structure creates more inherent conflicts between the private
developer's financial priorities and the community developer's goals
for the project. This was the case, for example, in the disputes over
the use of UDAG funds to reduce rents or cover construction overruns.
Not only do these conflicting interests contribute to the confronta-
tional tone of the partnership, but private developers are increasingly
unwilling to yield control over decisions that will impact the project
finances in the absence of 100 percent subsidized rents and finances.
Thus, future joint ventures that have similar financing charactersistics
will also have these conflicting interests, making it more difficult for
the community developer to gain control over decisions crucial to its
development goals. The previous page summarizes the community-private
developer conflicts under these newer development conditions with fewer
subsidies. The chart should be compared to the earlier summary on
page 27 to emphasize the changed relationship between the joint venture
partners.
The increased competition for financing and operating subsidies
was beginning to emerge in the Westland Arenue project, and this had
several effects. First, the ecarcity of subsidies puts more importance
on subsidy commitments as a development resource and gives the joint
venture partner with those commitments even greater leverage. Westland
Avenue, however, also illustrates the increased importance of community
support as a criterion for allocating subsidies, and thus as a develop-
ment resource with increasing leverage as well. As public officials are
forced to rank a greater number of proposals for fewer subsidies, dispos-
ition of surplus schools or distribution of CDBG funds, for example,
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community support in the form of a partner in the development team will
be increasingly valuable. FCDC was able to use this strategy with only
limited success, for the many reasons discussed in Chapter VI, but it is
likely that community developers in future joint ventures will find their
community support role carrying more weight in the partnership. For this
form of leverage to occur, however, it is imperative that community
developers have a strong influence over public officials who allocate
subsidies and public approvals. Westland Avenue Associates illustrates
the consequences of only moderate political support or influence on the
community developer's part.
It is also clear that FCDC's objectives for the project were
greatly affected by limited subsidies. The maximum number of low-
income units was only thirty, less than half being family units, and the
moderate rent tier was uncertain. These are relatively minor gains com-
pared to 115 Section 8 units in Marcus Garvey Gardens, and over 200 sub-
sidized units in 808 Memorial Drive. The solar building was a victory for
FCDC, but the community development effects are uncertain. Community
development groups are likely to face internal conflicts around partici-
pation in a project with so few direct community gains. In FCDC's case,
members were not comfortable being a partner in a project which they saw
as contributing to displacement pressures, and although this conflict was
never resolved, FCDC's participation was justified by the premise of
achieving some housing gains (a mixed-income solar building and subsidi-
zed family units) and the importance of the project in building the
organization's reputation as a community developer. Thus, community
developers in joint ventures such as Westland Avenue will have to accept
development that may be opposed to its objectives, such as luxury rentals
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or condominiums or high-priced offices, in order to achieve relatively
modest objectives and build organizational strength.
FCDC initially became involved in the project feeling that the
community development gains would be substantial enough to warrent its
support, however in the end the community group reverted to activities
more resembling communtiy and tenant organizing, suggesting that the gains
were not substantial enough and that political organizing was perceived as
being ultimately more productive.
An alternative strategy to joint venturing was fairly clear,
as FCDC could have remained independent of Westland Avenue Associates, and
along with other community groups could have pressured the developers
to include Section 8 family units, moderate rents, etc., with the threat
of community opposition to the UDAG and the 121(A) tax agreement. Whether
this would have yielded more results is not clear, but from FCDC's point of
view there were several disadvantages to this approach. It would not
have contributed to the organization's development record as a joint venture
did, nor would FCDC have taken such a position of leadership among Fenway
community organizations. FCDC would not have received any syndication
proceeds without the partnership position, and it is also doubtful that
the solar design could have been included. As a partner, FCDC had
access to business records that increased its negotiating effectiveness,
another benefit of joint venturing. For FCDC,. these were quite compelling
reasons to join Westland Avenue Associates, rather than remain as an
outside organization.
FCDC's participation essentially renews an older debate around
the appropriate role of community groups in housing development, as
mentioned in the~introduction. During the 1970's, arguments against
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community housing development corporations were largely overshadowed by
the relative abundance of subsidies and the successful efforts of many
community develoers such as those mentioned in Chapter IV. But in a period
of shrinking community resources, community developers cannot so easily
achieve their major development goals, and the older debate is increas-
ingly relevant. Should the community group's efforts be directed at
negotiating with private developers and public officials for gains that
will at most have a minimal effect on the overall problems, or should
efforts be spent instead on community and tenant organizing to increase
the community's poli.tical strength and thus its share of development
resources? It can be argued that community groups cannot pursue both of
these activities simultaneously, and that political organizing activtty
is more crucial particularly during periods of scarce subsidies. 3
This further raises the issue around the most advantageous
position for community develoers in future joint ventures, since FCDC's
limited partnership position, including no liability for operating
deficits and cpnstruction overruns, was very conducive to its tenant
advocacy position while still affording it some of the advantages mentioned
above. In previous. joint ventures, it was taken for granted that the
community developer desired the greates control and responsibility
for the project, with the ideal role being the sole developer. In
projects that are primarily private market developments, it may be
desirable for the community develoer to maintain somewhat opposing
interests to the private developer while trying to extract limited
community development gains from the project such as a percentage of low
income rental units. In this case, a limited partner position may be
more appropriate despite the disadvantages. As both the Westland Avenue
and 808 Memorial Drive joint ventures illustrate, a limited partner
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position can be quite consistent with an antagonistic relationship
between the community and private defeloper, although the community
developer cannot expect to have as major a decision making role in the
project as it would as a general partner.
The Westland Avenue joint venture reinforces many of the concl-
usions from the first part of this report, and suggests that the most
important strategies for community developers outlined in Chapter V are
still relevant to joint ventures with significantly different financing
structures. Site control is still extremely important, and community
developers should still seek to initiate their own projects as the first
step toward controlling critical resources. Defining in advance a clear
decision-making role for the community developer is also important,
although somewhat complicated by the uncertain financing. The problem
is that this development strategy will be increasingly difficult for
community developers as their traditional resources -- operating and
development grants, and site control over public parcels -- become less
available. To respond to the changing finance and subsidy picture,
community developers must consider a somewhat broader joint venture stra-
tegy which includes not only the major points arrived at from earlier
projects, but also incorporates the changes resulting from scarce sub-
sidies and innovative financing. The following is an attempt to bring
the lessons from Westland Avenue and previous joint ventures together
into a joint venture strategy for the future.
1. Defining and Limiting Goals
Community development groups frequently try to achieve many
different goals from one project, as mentioned early in this report.
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With the reduced availability of development subsidies, community
developers' goals will clearly have to be scaled down to realistically
correspond to the project under consideration. With a multitude of goals,
together being very difficult to achieve, there is a risk of increasing
conflicts with the private partner. In Westland Avenue, had FCDC concen-
trated on the few major housing goals of the project and its organiz-
ation building objectives, a smoother negotiating process would have
resulted. Instead, FCDC's multiple goals included as diverse and unre-
lated areas as providing local employment, demonstrating solar heat, and
reducing displacement pressures, and the introduction of these issues
into the negotiations gave the impression that the community group's
demands were unending and impossible to fully meet. In the end, FCDC
was forced to abandon its more peripheral objectives, including local
employment, control over resale, and general partnership status after
they had caused considerable conflict and proved non-negotiable. If the
community group's goals for the project were more limited and defined
from the beginning, some of the conflicts would have been avoided. This
is not to suggest that local employment or resale control are not import-
ant goals for community developers, but that a single, complicated joint
venture cannot accomodate all of an organization's diverse objectives.
Community developers entering joint ventures similar to Westland
Avenue will have to make difficult decisions regarding the project
objectives that have the greatest priority, can really be achieved, and
will be most beneficial to the organization's future. There should also
be a sense of which goals will be abandoned should finance changes dictate,
and which goals represent a "bottom line", below which participation in
the project is no longer valuable.
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2. Partnership Position and Development Role
Along with deciding on goals in advance, community groups
should carefully consider the most advantageous partnership position
when participating in developments that include only modest community
goals. Although a general partner position and a major development role
has usually been desirable, Westland Avenue illustrates both the advan-
tages and disadvantages of a limited partner position for the community
developer. Internal conflicts between a community developer's ultimate
goals and market-rate rental or condominium development may result in
a limited partner position being preferable to a general partner.
A limited partner position allows some distance betweeen the, project and
the organization, while the minimal liability allows the community group
to use its organizing activities as a way of strengthening its control
without conflicting with its own financial interests. Still, it is clear
that FCDC paid a high price for its limited position by not being
directly involved in major decisions.
3. Establishing an Early Position in the Project Through Resource
Contribution or Control
As in previous joint ventures, it is still imperative that
community developers establish an early role in the development project
and the partnership. Where possible, it is still advantageous to initiate
projects, and seek control over resources at an early stage. If FCDC
had maintained site control (through purchase options on two buildings)
its negotiating position would have been greatly improved. FCDC's later
attempts to provide cash equity were fruitless, partly because it came
to late in the partnership to be a valuable offer to the general partners.
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Providing some financial resources to the project is still an
important form of influence, even if the contribution is modest compared
to large subsidies or loan commitments of previous joint ventures.
Small development loans, CDBG funds, or developer designation will be
more valuable than ever. Maintaining funding for pre-development costs
and staffing is thus crucial for community groups to take an active role
in development projects. In Massachusetts, these funds come from a
variety of sources. The CEED program, already mentioned, funds core staff
for CDC's, but has had major federal cutbacks. Two important state
programs are the Community Economic Development Assistance Corporation
(CEDAC) and the Community Development Finance Corporation (CDFC). CEDAC
provides technical assistance to community developers, such as architect-
ural work, legal assistance, or other related development activities.
CDFC provides short-term funds for community developers to cover up-
front costs, usually backed by a guaranteed repayment from a permanent
mortgage or syndication. This requirement will unfortunately prevent
CDFC funds from being used at an early, more risky point in the develop-
ment. Other sources of financial support of this type include the
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISK) which is privately funded,
and interest-free loans from the Episcopal City Mission fund. Community
developers are highly dependent on these sources for their initiation
of projects and participation in joint ventures, and community groups
should actively pursue such funding for projects in the planning stages,
and support increased state and federal funding for programs such as CEED.
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4. Establish a Definite Role in the Decision Process
It is clearly important for community developer's to establish
a firm, unambiguous role in decision made within the partnership.
This is well illustrated by the Westland Avenue joint venture, as well
as projects described earlier. The difficulty which arrises in Westland
Avenue, and is likely to re-occur, is the increasing need to maintain
flexibility in the community developer's positions and have a strong
voice in ongoing decisions and unforeseen circumstances that result from
the uncertain financing situation. Ambiguity around control issues
prevented direct involvement by FCDC as conflicts arose, which could
be partially remedied by a more clarified decision role for the community
developer, however, FCDC also used ambiguity to its advantage as financing
changed and new negotiating issues arose. The purpose of a definite
decision-making role, then, should be to set a strong precedent in early
decisions so the community developer can also take a role in later decisions.
Essentially, this requires a role in the decision process, rather than
only over specified decisions. This would be the case, for example, if
FCDC were directly involved in early unit design and Section 8 allocations,
rather than responding to proposals by the architects and private develop-
ers, and then continued to take a direct role in future decisions.
5. Increasing the Value of Community Support and Expanding the
Community Support Role
Community developers should concentrate on increasing the value,
and in fact the necessity, of demonstrated community support as a criterion
for subsidy allocations and local government approvals. By doing so, an
important remaining resource to community developers that has the potential
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to be increased can be used to its fullest extent. Critical to this
strategy is the role of public officials in joint venture developments,
and community developers must act early in the process to gain the sup-
port of these people for their position in the partnership. A "tripar-
tite" relationship should be formed, with the community developer, private
developer, and government agencies all taking an active role in the
development. In the Westland Avenue development, the BRA and HUD were
relatively passive in decisions and disputes between the partners. By
actively supporting the community developer's efforts, government agencies
can reinforce any public funds in the project and leverage greater com-
munity benefits. In return, community developers can offer their
participation to facilitate neighborhood input in the development and
eventually to ensure that programs are adequately carried out.
Community developers must also broaden the so-called community
support role to contain more elements of a major partner role similar
to the Brightwood Development Corporation in its joint venture. If
community support can become a more valuable contribution to the partner-
ship, then community developers should expect a role similar to that
expected if they had contributed major subsidies or equity. In short,
precedents must be set so that the community support partner is more
of an equal to the private developer in the joint venture. These last
few points fall heavily on the importance of increasing the political
strenght of community organizations, since that is the principle way
that community support becomes a valuable asset. In this way, organizing
efforts by community groups are clearly important to that group's develop-
ment efforts, and will have an effect on its joint venture negotiations.
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As a final note, it is important that this joint venture
strategy will have impacts beyond the current development circumstances.
Making community support a more important element in a development
package will aid community development efforts at some later date, when
housing production subsidies may be more available, as well as during the
present subsidy shortage. Similarly, expanding the community support
role to include more control will also set valuable precedents for future
developments. Another consideration, and perhaps the most compelling
argument for community developers entering joint ventures even when the
benefits are small, is that even minor participation in housing develop-
ments during this period of little development activity will help
community developers to survive and continue operating in the future,
when development subsidies will hopefully be more available.
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- Appendix A: Original Agreement Between FCDC and HKS
Dec-mer11, 1979
Mathew Thall
nway Community Development Corporation
Burbank Street
ston, MA
ar Mat:
I would like to invite the Fenway Comunity Development
rporation to join Westland Avenue Associates in a partnership
rehabilitate ten vacant buildings for a mix of private aid
ibsidized housing.
Both the Nicosia Development Company and Harrington, Keefe
schork, Inc., the existing members of Westland Avenue Associates,
Lew the participation of a grass-roots community organization
3 a means of making this project both stronger and more sensitive
the needs of the neighborhood.
The FCDC would receive 20% of the syndication proceeds that
uld go to HKS, Inc., or 5% of the project's total syndication
oceeds.
The partnership will make every attempt to allocate this
hare to FCDC from the first two annual payments from investors.
FCDC will contribute its $50,000 solar grant for 65 and
7 Westland Avenue to the partnership for use in these buildings.
The project's architect, Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, Inc.,
as agreed to use Crowley/Powers Associates as a subcontractor
n the solar portion of the design work on 6.5 and 67 Westland
venue.
In order to address your concerns about current neighborhood
ousing needs, we ,have revised the subsidized portion of the total
07 unit project to include 12 three bedroom units and 8 two bedroom
ints as well as 10 of the 18 one bedroom units we originally
>roposed.
Though we wanted to remain beneath the 20% target HUD has
et for subsidized units, we acknowledge your desires for more
:ubsidized units by increasing the percentage of subsidized units
:o 30%. We still feel, however, that providing private market
mits in the Fenway is a legitimate, alternative means of reducing
One Boston Place, Boston, Massachusetts 02108 Tel: (617) 367-2760
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mr. Mathew Thall December 11, 1979
Fenway Community Development Corp6ration Page Two
displacement pressures, especially since these are now all vacant
buildings. Therefore, because of the limited availability of
Section 8 subsidies, we still are willing to proceed with the
project if only 20% of the units can be subsidized, rather than
abandon the project altogether.
Overall, this proposal is exciting and fits very nicely
the priorities set by HUD, with its inclusion of non-elderly sub-
sidized units. and its significant share of private market units.
Though I cannot make any commitments for the managing partner
in this joint venture, Mario Nicosia of NDC, it appears that an
advisory role in tenant selection for the subsidized units can
be arranged.
I believe this describes our conversations to date.
This is not a legal agreement as yet. We have to convert
the informal agreements, including a role for FCDC in management
issues, among the partners into a firm legal agreement by the
end of January 1980.
Nor is the design and unit mix at all final. Reviews by
HUD and critical re-evaluations internally by the partnership
may necessitate changes.
We look forward to a successful endeavor on Westland Avenue
of which we can all be very proud.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
HARRINGTON, KEEFE & SCHORK, INC.
F'rank T. Keefe, President
As agreed to by:
FENWAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
B-i 140Appendix B: FCDC Proposed Moderate Rents', June 1980
PROPOSED MODERATE RENTS
1980 Section 8
Income Li its
Projected
1982 Section
8 Limits *
RENTS
110% of Limit 125% of Limit 150% of Limit
Studio
1 person
1 BR
1 person
2 person
Average $11,625
2 BR
2 person
3 person
4 person
Average $13,950
3 BR
3 person
4 person
5 person
6 person
- Average $15,850
Market Rent
$345/$397
$443/$495
$609/Average
$707
SUBSIDY PER UNIT
110% of Limit 125% of Limit
$60/$112
$138/$192
$267
$291
$22/$74
$97/$151
$220
$235
150% of Limit
0/$8
$30/$84
$142
$140
* 1981 Limits = 1980 Limits X 1.07
1982 Limits = 1981 Limits X 1.07
$10,850 $12,422
$10,850
$12,400
$285 $323
$13,309
$389
$12,400
$13,950
$15,500
$305 $346 $413
$14,926
$13,950
$15,500
$16,500
$17,450
$342 $389 - $467
$18,147 $416 $472
Studio
1 BR
2 BR
3 BR
$567
.P
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PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION OF RENT MODEPATION SUBSIDIES
UNIT SIZE
Studio
1 Bedroom
2 Bedroom
3 Bedroom
125% OF
SECTION 8
Amount of subsidy required:
$ 7,968/month
$95,616/year
110% OF
SECTION 8
5
150% OF
SECTION 8
10
2
12
9
2
5
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